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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
F . C. STANGL, III, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BURTON M. TODD, et a l . , 
Defendant. 
MARATHON STEEL COMPANY, Case No. 14105 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BURTON M. TODD, et a l . , 
Defendants 
and T h i r d - P a r t y 
Plaintiffs , 
vs . 
F . C. STANGL, III, 
T h i r d - P a r t y 
Defendant. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, F . C. Stangl, III, brought suit under a contract for the 
fo rec losure of a mechan ic ' s l ien for construct ion work done by him on a 
h igh- r i se apar tment complex known as Canyon Road T o w e r s . Defendants, 
Burton M. Todd and E, Keith Lignell , counterc la imed, a s se r t ing dam-
ages for b reach of the same contrac t . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The T r i a l Court found that the agreement on which both pa r t i e s 
based the i r pr incipal case was valid and enforceable, held that the pla in-
tiff had breached the contract by refusing to pe r fo rm the construct ion 
and a s s e s s e d damages in favor of defendants in the sum of $340, 877. 00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendants ask the Court to affirm the Judgment of the T r i a l 
Court . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents d i sagree , in p a r t , with the Appellant1 s s p a r s e 
approach to the Statement of F a c t s , and to the select ive in te rpre ta t ion 
of the r eco rd contained in the Abs t rac t . Accordingly, Respondents will 
s tate additional facts and supplement the Abs t rac t . The Plaintiff-Appel-
lant will be r e f e r r e d to as M r . Stangl or the Cont rac tor . The Defendants^ 
Respondents will be called Dr. Todd or Dr. Lignel l , or jointly, the Doc-
t o r s . Exhibit 1-P will be designated the "Construct ion Agreement" or 
the "Contract . " Exhibit 5 2 - P will be called the "July 11th l e t t e r . " Ex-
hibit 13-D will be r e f e r r e d to a s the " January 25th Stangl bid, " and 
other wi tnesses and exhibits will be appropr ia te ly designated when and 
as requ i red . 
1-A 
D r s . Lignell and Todd w e r e prac t ic ing dent is ts in Salt Lake City 
who had, during the i r y e a r s of p r a c t i c e , built t h r ee apar tment houses , 
one of which was a h i g h - r i s e . The h igh - r i s e had been a poor inves tment 
because of i t s construct ion cos t s (R. 1087). In ea r ly 1972, they inquired 
of a rch i tec t Ronald L . Molen a s to the bes t u se for a t r a c t under option 
to them at Second Avenue and B Street in Salt Lake City. M r . Molen 
f i r s t considered a l o w - r i s e apa r tmen t for the t r ac t , then concluded that 
it was m o r e suitable for h i g h - r i s e development (R. 319). Density r e -
qu i rements l imited the project to 183 un i t s . 
The a rch i tec t , sensi t ive to the Doctors 1 concerns about h i g h - r i s e 
construct ion, repor ted to them that he had come a c r o s s a construct ion 
concept which pe rmi t t ed h igh - r i s e development at an economically f eas i -
b le cost . It involved a new type of s t ruc tu ra l b r i c k r ep re sen t ed to be 
nea r ly as inexpensive a s concre te blocks (R. 321 -2) . This b r i c k was 
cal led "Atlas Brick l ! by i t s exclusive local manufac tu re r , In te r s ta te 
Br ick Company. 
On Apri l 10, 1972, a t a meet ing a r r anged by M r . Molen, the 
Doctors met M r . Stangl, the Plaintiff-Appellant, a genera l con t rac tor 
who had been in the bus iness for twelve y e a r s and who had pe r fo rmed 
over 1,000 construct ion jobs (R. 12). At the meet ing , the new br i ck 
product , l a t e r known to the p a r t i e s a s "At las , " was d i scussed "at some 
length. " The size of the product , the fact that it was double-faced, 
avoiding the necess i ty for in te r io r finishing, i t s bear ing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
and i t s economic advantages we re re la ted by the a rch i t ec t Molen in the 
- 2 - •• 
p r e s e n c e of the p a r t i e s (R. 328. See also R. 1324). 
The p a r t i e s , Dr . Todd testif ied, a lso d iscussed on Apri l 10, a 
twin towers concept with a connecting link, ameni t i e s , a swimming pool 
and other construct ion detai ls (R. 328-9). The Doctors informed the 
Contractor and the a rchi tec t that the projec t was to be 100% financed 
(R. 329), and that , to be economically feas ible , it had to be built for 
$15. 00 pe r square foot or l e s s (R. 330). M r . Stangl said he felt he 
could build the projec t for that f igure (R. 331). 
The re la t ionship between the a rch i tec t Molen and the cont rac tor 
Stangl was c lose and in t imate . M r . Molen had done work for M r . Stangl 
before the Contractor had organized his own bus iness (R. 739). During 
the five or six y e a r s the Plaintiff had operated as F . C. Stangl Cons t ruc-
t ion Company (R. 12), over half of his work was designed by M r . Molen 
or his staff (R. 740). Conversely , at l eas t 20% of the g r o s s revenues 
in the Molen a rch i t ec tu ra l f i r m were rece ived f rom bus iness generated 
by M r . Stangl (R. 940). 
Shortly after the Apri l meet ing Dr . Todd decided to negotiate 
with M r . Stangl to build the pro jec t and so advised h im (R. 356). They 
met l a te r in Apri l , at the a rch i t ec t s office, and d iscussed , again, the 
subject of Atlas Br ick . At the meet ing, Dr. Todd, who had been asked 
to look at the Schet t le r -Wil l iams Building, a block s t r u c t u r e , said that 
he did not like block and that he would stay with b r i ck . M r . Stangl, in 
the p r e s e n c e of Dr . Todd, told his construct ion superintendent , M r . 
Goldman, that the projec t would move along easi ly with Atlas Br ick 
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because it would r equ i r e no painting or finishing of in te r io r wal ls 
(R. 334-5), 
After the second meeting in Apr i l , Dr . Todd, M r . Stangl and 
M r . Molen had frequent contacts and many d iscuss ions about the na tu re 
and p r ice of the projec t (R. 364). The Doctors , meanwhile , w e r e makin 
a r r angemen t s for financing and had, with M r . Stoddard, the mor tgage 
banker , a r r i ved at a f igure for the loan of $2, 350,000. 00. The r e su l t s 
of the d iscuss ions Dr . Todd was having with M r . Stoddard were commu-
nicated to the a rch i tec t and to Mr , Stangl. These d i scuss ions , which 
we re c r i t i ca l to the a r r angemen t , concerned the acquisi t ion of cons t ruc -
tion funds and the determinat ion of the amount r equ i red . 
Thereaf te r , Dr . Todd asked for a f i rm p r i ce for the const ruct ion 
and rece ived the p r i c e set forth in the July 11th l e t t e r , to-wit , 
$2 ,399 ,222 .00 . The le t te r designated four i t e m s , 43 , 51 , 52 and 53, 
a s a l lowances . The p r i c e contained in the July 11th l e t t e r was , at f i r s t , 
ve rba l . It was put in wri t ing, and i temized , a s a r e su l t of Dr . Todd !s 
reques t for a figure he could count on. M r . Stangl was told that a f i rm 
p r i c e was requ i red and, con t r a ry to Stangl1 s t es t imony at the t r i a l , 
did not, Dr . Todd said, ever c h a r a c t e r i z e the f igure a s a "budget, M 
an " e s t i m a t e " or an "object ive" (R. 1343-4)* 
The Doctors re l ied on M r . Stangl !s f igures . Dr . Todd test i f ied 
that but for his belief that t he re was ag reement with Stangl to build the 
buildings for the contract p r i c e , the p a r t i e s would never have entered 
into the a r r angemen t shown by Exhibits 24-D, 25-D and 26-D (R. 388). 
Those exhibits a r e (Ex. 24) a p r o m i s s o r y note to the l enders for 
$2 ,350 ,000 .00 , (Ex. 25) the t ru s t deed secur ing it , and (Ex. 26) a 50-
year l ease on the land for the project requir ing the Doctors to pay 
$2, 000, 000. 00 at the r a t e of $3, 333. 34 pe r month. 
The a rch i tec t s were proceeding with the development of the plans 
and specifications. According to the a rch i tec t Molen, M r . Stangl, who, 
himself admitted that he was in v i r tua l daily contact with the a rch i t ec tu ra l 
f i rm (R. 634), was "pr ivy" to the plans as they developed and observed 
exactly what was going on (R. 1212). 
Sometime in ear ly September on 1972, Stangl observed that the 
plans provided for Atlas Br ick on all bear ing wal l s , both in te r io r and 
ex te r io r . When the ma t t e r was called to the attention of the a rch i tec t , 
M r . Molen said, ' ' The re ' s been a monumental misunders tanding . " As 
a resu l t , Mr . Wadsworth, a s t ruc tu ra l engineer , was employed to study 
the use and cost of Atlas Br ick . He d iscussed this with M r . Stangl and 
M r . Money and p r e p a r e d analyses (Ex. 100-D) showing how the Atlas 
Br ick would be used and i ts cost . The engineer d iscussed the ma t t e r with 
M r . Stangl and with the a rch i t ec t s (R. 1267) and thereaf te r 8 inch Atlas 
Br ick continued to be used in the plans for the outside wall and 6 inch 
Atlas Br ick was decided on for the in te r io r , without any further objection 
by Stangl. In fact, Dr. Todd testified that Stangl never indicated to him 
that he did not expect to build the building of b r i ck - - until January 15, 
1973, the t ime of b r e a c h (R. 1342 and 1344). 
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In October, 1972, M r . Stangl followed up the July 11th l e t t e r with 
a full-fledged Construct ion Agreement , drawn by his l awyers at his r e -
quest for execution p r io r to the commencement of const ruct ion. The 
Agreement was del ivered to the Doctors about October 10th (R. 396). 
It contained, among other th ings , the bas ic contract p r i c e . The Doctors , 
without consulting an a t torney, proposed only two changes (see red 
colored i n s e r t s on Ex. 2-D). The f i r s t added the words "and Owner" in 
two p laces , so as to provide that the Owners should pa r t i c ipa te in the 
select ion and approval of m a t e r i a l s and p repara t ion of final drawings , 
and the second changed the upper l imi t of the pro jec ted r en ta l s f rom 
$200. 00 to $250. 00. While page 2 of the Construct ion Agreement was 
being re typed, the Doctors , on October 11 , 1972, signed and del ivered 
the $2, 350, 000. 00 note, the t r u s t deed and the $2, 000, 000. 00 land lease 
(Ex. * s 24-D, 25-D and 26-D) essen t ia l to the p ro jec t . The next day the 
final draft of the Construct ion Agreement was ready and the Doctors and 
the Contractor met and signed Ex. 1-P (R. 400). M r . Stangl did not d i s -
c u s s , modify or l imit the text of the cont rac t . He m e r e l y said he had 
made the changes the Doctors reques ted (R. 400). 
Exhibit 1-P, the Construct ion Agreement , Ex. 9-D, the drawings 
which were developed, Ex. 10-D, the specifications which were developed, 
and the in t e r im plans and specifications which, by the t e r m s of the Con-
s t ruct ion Agreement became pa r t of the contrac t as they w e r e developed, 
m u s t be read together . (See Ex. 1-P, Section 1.1 (e) and Genera l Condi-
t ion Ar t ic le 1 (a) which is set forth hereaf ter on page 46 . ) 
. . -6- ' . 
The Agreement is lengthy, covering vir tual ly every contingency. 
In summary , it contains in Ar t ic le I, "Definitions, " the names of the 
pa r t i e s and desc r ibes the "Work" as meaning the complete construct ion 
and equipping of a 1 83 unit apar tment complex with re la ted fac i l i t ies . 
It provides that, 
"(e) The "Contract" shall mean and refer to the following: 
(1) this Agreement ; 
(2) the General Conditions, the Supplementary General 
Conditions, the P lans and Specifications as developed 
and other m a t t e r s enumerated and set out in Exhibit 
" B " he re to . 
(3) work change o r d e r s i ssued or to be i s sued . " 
(Emphasis added) 
Ar t ic le II se ts forth the undertaking of the Contractor and contains 
the following: 
"Section 2. 2. The pa r t i e s here to ag ree that Contractor has 
p repa red the contract p r i ce based upon p r e l i m i n a r y plans 
and specifications p r e p a r e d by Ronald Molen, AIA. Detailed 
working drawings have not yet been finally p r epa red . Con-
t r a c t o r , Archi tect and Owner shall work together in p r e p a r a -
tion of final drawings and with the approval of Archi tect , and 
Owner, Contractor shall have the r ight to specify m a t e r i a l s 
to be used. The le t te r at tached here to a s Exhibit " C " with 
i ts at tached cost breakdown, se ts forth types of m a t e r i a l s 
to be specified in the final plans and working drawings and 
also a cost breakdown for the respec t ive i t ems in the pro jec t . 
Any deviations f rom the i t ems specified in the l e t t e r shall 
cause an adjustment in the p r i c e , a s set forth on the a t tach-
ment . " (Emphasis added) 
Ar t ic le III is a provis ion for change o r d e r s , permi t t ing addit ions, 
deletions or modifications "without invalidating the cont rac t . " Of p a r t i -
cular note i s the provis ion "any adjustment in the contract sum resul t ing 
in a credi t or charge to the Owner shall be de termined by mutual a g r e e -
ment of the p a r t i e s before s tar t ing the work involved in the change. " 
- 7 -
Art ic le IV provides that the Owner shall pay the Cont rac tor , for 
the work, the sum of $2, 399, 222. 00, and that "Payment of th i s amount 
is subject to additions or deductions in accordance with pa r ag raph 3.1 
[ Changes in the Work] and the other documents to which this Contract is 
subject. " P r o g r e s s or percentage payments and a final payment after 
completion a r e provided. Ar t ic le V, the m e r g e r c lause , s ta tes that the 
Contract r e p r e s e n t s the full and complete unders tanding between the Owner 
and the Contractor and that it may only be amended in wr i t ing . (See Ex. 1-P 
and page 25 of this Brief for exact text . ) 
Ar t ic le VII of the Appel lant ' s Contract , p rovides that , 
"The Contractor and the Owner and the i r r e spec t ive s u c c e s -
s o r s and ass igns shall be bound to the full pe r fo rmance of 
the covenants and ag reemen t s contained in this Contrac t . , f 
(Emphasis added) 
Other provis ions re la te to the control of the projec t and i ts subcon-
t r a c t o r s , the resolut ion of conflicts, the t e rmina t ion of the c o n t r a c t / 
bonding and the t ime of pe r fo rmance . More pa r t i cu la r ly , the pe r fo rmance 
provis ion i s as follows: 
"Contrac tor a g r e e s to commence the Work within twenty (20) 
days after execution of this ag reemen t and to complete the 
Work within 365 days f rom date of commencement . " 
The July 11th l e t t e r was at tached to the Construct ion Agreement 
for those purposes specifically set forth in Section 2. 2. It shows the 
types of m a t e r i a l s to be specified in the final p lans and working drawings , 
It should be noted that Section 10. 2 p e r m i t s t e rmina t ion by the Owner 
without pre judice to any other r emedy he may have, when the Contractor de -
faults in the pe r fo rmance of any provis ion the re in . 
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contains a cost breakdown and se ts a s tandard, any deviation f rom which 
shall cause "an adjustment in the p r i c e . " The four i t ems designated a s 
"al lowances, " a r e dist inguished f rom all other i t ems included in the bas ic 
$2, 399, 222. 00 p r i c e . The al lowances were for c a rpe t s , landscape , spr ink-
ling sys tems and d r a p e s . As is c lea r f rom the wording of Section 2. 2, 
t he re is no incorporat ion by re fe rence of any port ion of the July 11th l e t t e r 
other than the types and cos ts of the m a t e r i a l s l i s ted . 
The General Conditions r e i t e r a t e the scope of the documents con-
stituting the contract and specify that the Contract cons is t s of the Agree -
ment , of the General Conditions and Supplementary Genera l Conditions, 
and of the Drawings and Specifications. It includes modifications incor -
pora ted before i ts execution, working drawings to be completed by the 
Archi tec t and the Contrac tor , and change o r d e r s p rope r ly executed. 
The General Conditions fur ther provide , among other th ings , that t i m e is 
of the essence of the Contract , that the law of the State of Utah shall govern 
and that the Contract documents a r e complementa ry and what is cal led for 
by any one shall be as binding a s if cal led for by a l l . Ar t ic le 3 of the 
Genera l Conditions (G. C.) again r e f e r s to the fact that the drawings shall 
be p r e p a r e d consistent with the contract documents . G. C. Ar t ic le 10 
ref lects the following duty on the p a r t of the Contrac tor : 
"The Contrac tor shall give efficient supervis ion to the Work 
using the bes t skill and attention and shall carefully study 
and compare all drawings , specifications and other i n s t r u c -
t ions and shall at once r epo r t to the Archi tec t any e r r o r , in-
consis tency or omiss ion which may be d i scovered . " 
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The Construct ion Agreement contains twenty-four pages , plus 
the plans and specifications as developed, and appears on i ts face to be 
a complete and exhaustive ag reement . Dr. Todd test if ied that the plans 
on hand by the t ime of i ts execution covered all the essen t ia l components 
of the pro jec t . He said (R. 412): 
n Q . (By M r . Tanner) Do you know general ly which drawings 
or what the subject of the drawings were that you had had 
in hand and examined by that t i m e ? (October 15, 1972) 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. What was i t? 
A. It was mainly plot plan, floor plan, e levat ions , drawings 
of the parking r a m p . 
Q. Except for detai l , does that compr i se al l the essen t ia l 
e lements of this p ro jec t? 
A. Yes, it does . 
Q. Had you d iscussed those before July 11 ? 
A. Y e s . " 
Exhibit 78-D, mos t , if not all, of which was p r e p a r e d before the exe-
cution of the Construct ion Agreement , contained 37 sheets of p l ans . 
M r . Molen recommended M r . Stangl to the Doctors , init ially, 
because M r . Stangl had p r iced a h i g h - r i s e apa r tmen t s t r uc tu r e which 
was to be built with federa l funds (R. 1082). The projec t , which failed 
for lack of funding, (called SMH for Stangl, McRae, Hatch) was p r iced , 
2 3 
apparent ly in met iculous detai l , f rom the avai lable plans (R. 547). 
The SMH plans we re identified as Exhibit 7 5 - P . They contain 
^The SMH projec t was p r i ced twice , M r . Stangl said, and checked by the 
government each t ime on a computer (R. 635). 
3
 By October 15, the plans for Canyon Towers w e r e infinitely m o r e complete 
than the SMH plans had ever been. 
four (4) pages and a r e ve ry p r e l im ina ry . As ear ly as July 1 1 , 3 months 
before the Construction Agreement was executed, M r . Stangl had ava i l -
able to him, at the ve ry l eas t , the May 6, 1972, drawings , E x ' s . 7-D and 
7-D(A). Mr , Molen affirmed that if M r . Stangl could p r i c e f rom the SMH 
drawings, he could p r i ce f rom the May 6 drawings at Canyon Towers . 
His typically re luctant tes t imony was as follows (R. 1215-16). 
! ,Q. Now, you have observed Exhibits 75, haven' t you? 
The SMH P r o j e c t ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That set of four pages is the mos t p r e l i m i n a r y , the 
mos t inexplicit , the mos t inexact of ske tches , i s it not? 
A. I t ' s a p r e l im ina ry drawing. 
Q. Very, ve ry p r e l i m i n a r y ? Is t h e r e m a t e r i a l on i t ? 
A. No. 
Q. Is the dimensioning on i t ? 
A. Well, i t f s to sca le . There a r e dimensions h e r e . 
Q. You have some on i t . No de ta i l s? 
A. (Nodding no . ) 
Q. Is it m o r e or l e s s complete than th is set of p lans dated 
May 6, 1972, which is 7-D-A? 
A. Well, for pr ic ing I !d have to say that they a r e reasonably 
s im i l a r . 
Q. Sure , if you could p r i c e f rom the one you could p r i c e f rom 
the o the r? 
A. They a r e both very p r e l i m i n a r y . 
Q. Yes . But if you could p r i ce one you could p r i c e f rom the o ther , 
so if you could bid one you could bid the other; r igh t? In your 
exper ience would that be a fair assumpt ion? 
A. Y e s c " (Emphasis added) 
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By October 12, or 18, 1972, the date the Construction Agreement 
was signed, the plans on the Canyon Towers projec t had been grea t ly r e -
fined, as wi tness the 37 pages of Ex. 78-D, and all essent ia l e lements 
had been reso lved . 
The T r i a l Court had to make a judgment a s to what was in the p lans 
by the Construction Agreement date and what was included l a te r in o r d e r to 
reso lve the question of which i t e m s , if any, would be counted as "ex t ras ' 1 
or "changes11 in ascer ta in ing damages . This subject is d i scussed in detail 
at Point II C 2 hereaf te r . 
M r . Stangl commenced the pe r fo rmance of const ruct ion by s tar t ing 
demolit ion through a subcontractor on about October 15, 1972. Stangl 's 
own men, under the d i rec t supervis ion of L a r r y Burton, who was the 
const ruct ion foreman employed by Stangl, began work on the si te in ear ly 
November . Burton test if ied that he was in c lose , d i rec t and persona l con-
tact with Stangl. He rece ived plans f rom M r . Goldman, the superintendent 
respons ib le for all Stangl p ro jec t s (R. 1240-41). The plans Burton had at 
that t ime w e r e sufficient, he said, for const ruct ion (R. 1242). 
Although Molen and Stangl had talked about Atlas Br ick pr ic ing as 
ea r ly a s September 18, 1972, (R. 1214-15) and while Stangl had full r e spon-
sibil i ty for such pr ic ing (R. 1215), Stangl, the con t rac to r , failed to obtain 
a bid for Atlas Br ick unti l long after he signed the Construct ion Agreement . 
The f i rs t Atlas Br ick bid, M r . Stangl test if ied, was acquired on November 
28, 1973 (R. 1311). Stangl had p r i ced "masonry , " a t e r m the Court found 
to mean Atlas Br ick , at $175,416. 00 on the July 11th pr ic ing breakdown 
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(Ex. 11-D) and again, in October in the Construction Agreement (Ex. 1-P). 
In his next "bid, lf the January 25th, 1973, pr ic ing (Ex. 13-D), he showed 
the masonry at $499, 755. 00, a difference of $324, 339. 00. 
About Chr i s tmas t ime , 1972, Burton, the foreman, was pulled off 
the project and sent to another job (R. 1249-50). Sometime in the f i r s t 
half of January , 1973, Stangl told Burton "That is it on the Canyon Towers 
job, n meaning the job was off or finished (R. 1250). No work was done by 
Stangl on the si te after C h r i s t m a s , 1972. 
Around January 10, 1973, Dr. Todd at tempted to r e a c h M r . Stangl 
by phone severa l t i m e s , without s u c c e s s . His purpose , he said, was to 
see what Stangl1 s p lans were for moving ahead (R. 419-20). Stangl finally 
called back, told Dr . Todd he had n purpose ly avoided" re turning his ca l l s , 
that he, Stangl, had been getting p r i c e s , and suggested a meeting on or 
about January 13 or 14 at StanglTs office. The Doctor and M r . Stangl me t 
and Stangl, who cha rac te r i zed the meeting at the beginning by saying n Thi s 
i s going to be the God-damnedest unhappiest conference we have ever been 
in , f l indicated that the p r i c e s were going up (R. 421). Then M r . Stangl 
suggested that he could solve the p rob lem by becoming a pa r tne r with the 
Doctors in the Canyon Towers Pro jec t (R. 425). 
M r . Stangl and Dr. Todd met with the a rch i tec t , M r . Molen, two or 
t h r ee days l a t e r . M r . Molen repor ted to Dr . Todd, after the meet ing, that 
Stangl had told him, f,I a m not going to build the projec t un less I get a piece 
of the act ion" (R. 424). Stangl then proceeded to have his l awyers draw a 
wri t ten P a r t n e r s h i p Agreement (Ex. 4-D) and an "Amendment" to the 
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Construction Agreement (Ex. 5-D), and sent the documents to the Doctors. 
There was a meeting between the Doctors and Stangl about January 25, 
1973, where Mr. Stangl refused to discuss prices,followed by a heated 
exchange of words and no agreement (R. 425-6). 
At the same time, Mr. Stangl provided the Doctors with a January 
25, 1973, price breakdown or "bid" as he characterized it (Ex. 13-D). 
It showed a price of $2, 700, 450. 00, without "overhead and profit. n 
Overhead and profit had been 10% on the prior pricings. This is the "bid" 
the Trial Court held to be the best information as to cost of completion, 
having come from Stangl!s own mouth and being proximate in time to the 
date of breach. The Trial Court found (Finding 15, R. 1576) that the cost 
to complete as of January 25, 1973, was $2,970,450.00. This is the basic 
figure from which the damages were calculated by the Trial Court. 
During the next month and one-half the parties tried to settle their 
differences, but could not. On March 3, 1973, Mr. Stangl submitted a 
second price of $3, 413, 200. 00 (Ex. 14-D) for the project and on March 9, 
1973, Cannon Construction Company bid $3,658,423.00 (Ex. 69-D and test i -
mony of Ranch Kimball, R. 689 to 695). 
Later in March the Doctors, through their attorney, sent, as pro-
vided in the Construction Agreement, a written demand that Stangl r e -
commence construction for the contracted price and he, Stangl, responded 
on April 9, 1973, by filing a Notice of Lien (Ex. 53-P) and, on the same 
day, filing the Complaint to foreclose. 
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FACTS ON DAMAGES 
Exhibit 70-D is a summary of the out-of-pocket costs of the 
Doctors on this pro jec t , none of which were r ecove red . The component 
e lements a r e supported by exhibits and tes t imony. Exhibits 65-D and 
66-D a r e the a rch i tec t s invoices showing fees of $39, 855. 00 re la t ing 
to th is projec t . Exhibits 17-D, 18-D, 22-D and 71-D and the tes t imony 
respect ing them show loan commitment and p u r c h a s e - l e a s e - b a c k fees 
amount to $106, 000. 00 paid by the Doctors on th is pro jec t . L e a s e pay-
ments made w e r e , Dr. Todd testified, $64 ,000 .00 (R. 453); the r e - p u r -
chase p r e m i u m necess i ta ted by the plaintiff?s fai lure to const ruct was 
$50, 000. 00. These i tems and other cos ts shown by the checks compris ing 
Ex. ! s 72-D and 73-D, the bil l ings for the lender1 s a t to rney f s fees and the 
closing s ta tements shown as Ex. fs 67-D, 68-D and 71-D, support and 
verify that the Doctors incur red out-of-pocket unrecovered expenses of 
$276, 390. 32. The Tr ia l Court held that $3, 800. 00 was the cost of demo-
lit ion, a benefit to the Doctors , leaving actual expenditures of $272, 590. 32 
suffered by the Doctors a s damages , expenditures r ende red u s e l e s s by 
Appellant 's b r each of the Construction Contract . The T r i a l Court showed 
these i t ems in i ts Findings signed on M a r c h 24, 1975, (Findings 19, 20 
and 21 , R. 1622-23) which Findings w e r e l a t e r s t r icken for the reason 
that the "cost of completion" m e a s u r e was ut i l ized by the court , r a the r 
than the "out-of-pocket" m e a s u r e (R. 1580). 
The Tr i a l Court reques ted counsel to br ief the legal question of 
the p rope r m e a s u r e of damages and the p a r t i e s submitted memoranda . 
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Defendants memo is at R. 1 642-46; plaintiff fs answering m e m o and sup-
port ing cases a r e found at R. 1668 to 1723 and de fendan t s reply m e m o -
randum and author i t ies at R. 1647 to 1661. This Court may find the 
xe rox copies of ca se s and author i t ies accumulated and at tached to said 
memoranda to be a convenient aid in expediting i t s r e s e a r c h . 
Plaintiff introduced a l is t of 45 i t ems he contended to consti tute 
depa r tu re s f rom or additions to the pro jec t a s he contemplated it 
(R. 560 to R. 61 9A). These i t ems were examined carefully in the r eco rd 
and it was determined that many had been in the p lans by the t ime of the 
signing of the Construct ion Agreement , and that s eve ra l o the r s , which 
4 
we re pure ly fictional, we re not on any plans and never had been . 
T h e r e w e r e , however, a number of i t ems in the p lans , Ex. 9-D, which 
fell into ca tegor ies consist ing of (1) i t e m s which the Doctors had ag reed 
to pay ext ra for, and (2) i t ems on which t he r e was a conflict between the 
tes t imony of M r . Stangl and Dr . Todd. These i t ems a r e summar i zed on 
page 2 of Ex. 116-D. Dr . Todd test if ied respect ing these i t ems at 
pages R. 1343 to R. 1361 and the Court made i ts de terminat ion as shown 
at pages R. 1131 to R. 1173. The Court reso lved I tem 1, Atlas Br ick 
in te r io r wal l s , against the plaintiff, and reso lved all of the nADMITTEDM 
i t ems in favor of plaintiff, holding that plaintiff was entitled to rece ive 
c red i t for $181, 749. 00 plus a por t ion of the "DENIED" i t ems amounting 
to $7, 726. 00 (R. 1548) for a total of $189,475. 00. The Court found that 
the cost of completion a s of J anua ry 25, 1973, was $2, 970,450. 00. 
4 S e e , for example q u a r r y t i le and light f ix tu res , which a r e not on 
any of the drawings . 
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Of that cost , $189,475, 00 would have been payable to M r . Stangl a s 
"extras" or "addit ions, " had he built them. The cost of completing 
the project as it was contemplated when the Construction Agreement 
was signed* i« e« , without the " e x t r a s , " the Court found, was 
$2, 780, 975. 00. Of that f igure, plaintiff had furnished $40, 876. 00, and 
the unpaid port ion of the contrac t p r i ce was $2, 399, 222. 00 leaving a 
net damages figure of $340, 879. 00, which was awarded to defendants. 
THE ATLAS BRICK CONTROVERSY 
M r . Stangl acknowledged at the t r i a l that t he r e was a ve ry se r ious 
d iscrepancy between his tes t imony and that of Dr . Todd on the i s sue of 
Atlas Br ick . The re had to be , he said, unders ta t ing what, char i tably , 
was obvious, "an e r r o r on one of our p a r t s " (R. 776). Stangl test if ied 
that he never agreed , at any t ime "for any p r i c e " (R. 767-9) to build a 
b r i ck building, and that he told the Doctors before making any commit -
ment , and cer ta in ly before the commencement of construct ion, that the 
projec t was to be const ructed of spl i t - face block (Re 775). 
At the t r i a l , m o r e t ime and tes t imony was spent d iscuss ing whether 
the t e r m "mason ry" in the Construct ion Agreement meant Atlas Br ick , 
a s the Doctors test if ied, or some kind of block, a s M r . Stangl contended, 
than any other i s s u e . This con t roversy involved the pr inc ipa l "change" 
that M r . Stangl c la imed vit iated the cont rac t . It i s mos t difficult to de t e r -
mine f rom Appellant 's Brief and Abs t rac t that th is i s sue was extensively 
d i scussed on the r e c o r d and resolved against the Contractor by the Tr i a l 
Court. The Appel lant ' s Brief, for all intents and pu rpose s , is en t i re ly 
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silent on the m a t t e r . 
Dr. Todd test if ied that the defendants had contrac ted for a solid 
b r i ck building, and no other kind. He said that Atlas Br ick , which had 
s t ruc tu ra l bear ing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , was d i scussed at the f i r s t meet ing 
of the p a r t i e s (R. 327-8) and at all t imes thereaf te r (R. 332-6). Br ick , 
he said, was cent ra l to the init ial concept of the h igh - r i s e const ruct ion, 
and it was b r i ck and the economic feasibil i ty of Atlas construct ion which 
convinced the defendants in the face of adve r se exper ience to commit to 
the construct ion of another h igh - r i s e pro jec t (R. 1086-8). The Doctors f 
other apar tment pro jec ts were all const ructed of b r i ck or b r i ck veneer , 
in dist inctive Navajo or Navajo Mingle co lors (R. 1083-4). The a rch i t ec t , 
M r . Molen, testified that Dr. Todd had an avers ion to block (R. 1088) 
and was thinking of br ick , "per iod" (R. 1176). Dr . Todd test if ied that 
he refused to consider block and so informed M r . Stangl well before the 
p repa ra t ion of the July 11 le t ter (Ex. 52 -P) . 
Before the end of October, 1972, Dr . Todd again d i scussed Atlas 
Br i ck with M r . Stangl and with the a rch i t ec t . He ins t ruc ted them both, 
he said, on separa te occas ions , that the b r i ck should be o rde red so as 
to avoid construct ion delays (R. 401). Atlas Br ick with i t s two finished 
sur faces which requ i red no in te r io r finishing, was a bear ing m a t e r i a l 
essen t ia l to the bas ic construct ion of the pro jec t . The construct ion f o r e -
man , M r . Burton, admit ted that the need for the b r i ck was urgent and 
tha t it was requ i red in the ini t ial s tages of const ruct ion (R. 1255). 
Defendants find pass ing re fe rence to the t e r m "mason ry" on page 12 
of the Brief, and to At las Br i ck on page 36, in a footnote on page 37, and 
nowhere e l s e . 
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Brick was in short supply and the Doctors , who had experienced cons t ruc -
tion delays waiting for b r ick on another pro jec t , wished to avoid p rob lems 
of a s imi la r nature at Canyon Road Towers (R. 401-2) . M r . Stangl told 
Dr . Todd that the o rde r for b r i ck would be placed (R. 403). 
M r . Stangl, whose credibi l i ty was under se r ious challenge, denied 
having d iscussed Atlas Br ick with M r . Molen before the Apri l 10 meet ing 
at F o r t Douglas, or with the Doctors at that meet ing , or with Dr . Todd 
and o the r s , l a t e r , at M r . Molen 's conference room. It was not d iscussed , 
he said, at any t ime before the Construct ion Agreement was executed 
(R. 767). 
M r . Stangl test if ied a s follows (R. 760): 
MR. ALLRED: Q. "Were you ever advised by M r . Molen 
p r i o r to the May 6, 1972 drawings that he was contemplating 
the use of Atlas Br ick on this p ro jec t? 
A. Absolutely not. I had never heard of Atlas Br ick p r io r 
to that t i m e . 
Q. Never heard of Atlas Br i ck? 
A. Never even heard of it . It was never in exis tence . It 
had never been made , and I had never heard of it. 
Q. Never heard of i t ? 
A. Never . " (Emphasis supplied) 
Stangl test if ied that Atlas Br ick was never intended for the Canyon 
Towers projec t , that on October 15, 1972, when the Contract was executed, 
he had not known that Atlas Br ick was contemplated for the projec t (R. 559-
60), and that he ceased to pe r fo rm in December about the t ime he f i r s t 
l ea rned that Atlas Br i ck was to be used (R. 789-90). His exact words in 
tha t r e g a r d w e r e a s fol lows: 
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Q. "All r ight . But in your deposition you test i f ied that it 
was December before you f i r s t became appr i sed of the 
existence of Atlas br ick in the p lans , did you not? 
A. I think what we were stating - - again, I don't know exactly. 
Q. You can say yes or no. Did you so testify or did you not 
so test ify? 
A. They a r e h e r e in Court . 
Q. Well, le t m e read you th is , f rom P a g e s 88 and 89 (of Stangl !s 
deposit ion). 
'Q. Now, what else was added to the pro jec t that 
caused you to c h a r a c t e r i z e it as a changed luxury 
p ro jec t? 
A. Solid b r i ck building, for one thing. 
Q. P a r d o n ? 
A. A solid b r i ck building, for one thing. 
Q. Now, what did you think it was to be in the f i r s t 
p lace and what did you unders tand it to be in the 
a r c h i t e c t ' s drawings l a t e r ? 
A. A block building. 
Q. And then by the per iod around Chr i s tmas of 1972, 
you became appr i sed that the a rch i t ec t and the owner 
expected an Atlas b r i ck building; is that t r u e ? 
A. Yes, s i r . 
Q. Now, when you became appr i sed that they expected 
the Atlas b r i ck instead of the block, is that the t i m e you 
ceased to work fur ther on the p ro jec t ? 
A. The two fit by accident , not nece s sa r i l y by design. 
Q. You didn't pull off because of the i r ins i s tence on 
the Atlas b r i c k ? 
A. No s i r . ' 
20-
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Q. Now, that is what you told us in June of 1972, isn f t i t ? 
A. And I stil l feel thatTs consis tent with what I have been 
telling you today and yes te rday and the five days before that . 
Q. All r ight . So this i s sti l l your t es t imony? 
A. Yes, s i r . " (Emphasis added) 
M r . Stangl !s tes t imony was inconsis tent in ter se and in s t a rk con-
t r a s t to the tes t imony of o thers and to the plans and specif icat ions. Re-
butting tes t imony and evidence was as follows: 
1. Joe P a s s , f rom In ters ta te Br ick , the sole local manufac turer 
of Atlas Br ick , testified that on F e b r u a r y 3, 1972, he pe rsona l ly attended 
a conference with M r . Stangl (who had a l ready testified he had not even 
heard of Atlas Br ick by May of 1972) at M r . Molen1 s office, where Atlas 
Br ick was demonst ra ted and d iscussed (R. 1117-1118). M r . P a s s had his 
or iginal conference notes f rom the meeting (Ex. 104-D). 
2. By September 18, 1972, a month before the Construct ion Agree -
ment , Stangl and the a rch i tec t had d iscussed Atlas Br ick extensively and 
Molen had told Stangl the Doctors were thinking about the building in 
b r i ck . (Molen tes t imony, R. 1176-77 and R. 1214). 
3. By September 18, 1972, before the execution of the Contract , 
Stangl (who said he had not even "contemplated" Atlas Br ick by this date) 
and Wadsworth, the consulting engineer, had met and d iscussed the u se 
of Atlas Br ick on the pro jec t . M r . Wadsworth had p r e p a r e d his s t ruc tu ra l 
study (Ex. 101-D) containing Atlas Br ick calculat ions and p r i c e s , and had 
talked with M r . Money, the draf tsman, and Stangl about i t . (Ex. 101-D, 
Wadsworth tes t imony, R. 1265-8 and Molen tes t imony R. 1198.) 
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4. M r . Stangl, (who had test i f ied that he had never agreed to 
build a b r i c k building at any t i m e "for any p r i c e " ) , had pe r sona l ly told 
Joe P a s s that he needed At las B r i ck by J anua ry 15, 1973 (R. 1034). 
The Stangl office gave the d imensions for the b r i c k r equ i r ed to M r . 
P a s s so that the b r i ck could be manufac tured (R. 1135-37, R. 1148) and 
250, 000 Atlas Br ick , Navajo Mingle in color , w e r e in fact manufactured 
by I n t e r s t a t e Br ick and ready for de l ivery by J a n u a r y 15, 1973, pursuan t 
to the manufactur ing r eques t and o r d e r (R. 1138 and Ex. ?s 105-D and 
106-D). 
5. M r . Stangl obtained bids f rom b r i c k m a s o n s for the u s e of 
At las B r i c k (Rozema tes t imony , R. 1260, 1262, Stangl R. 1310-11) 
a month before the date he had tes t i f ied that he f i r s t l ea rned that At las 
B r i c k was to be used and had contemporaneous ly discontinued work. 
6. Eve ry drawing and every sheet of p lans which designated 
the wall m a t e r i a l f rom a t ime p r i o r to September 18, 1972, to and in-
cluding the final set of p lans (Ex. 9-D) showed Atlas Br ick , exclusively, 
by name and symbol on all ex te r io r w a l l s . ' 
7. Eve ry drawing and every sheet of p lans f rom p r i o r to Septem-
b e r 18, 1972, to and including Ex. 9-D, except for one, showed in t e r io r 
s t r u c t u r a l wal ls of Atlas Br i ck . The one exception was changed back to 
At las B r i ck after the Wadsworth study. 
8. The a rch i t ec t Molen test i f ied that in September of 1972, he 
had d i scussed the pr ic ing of Atlas Br ick with Stangl (R. 1214-15). 
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9. L a r r y Burton, M r . Stangl 's construct ion foreman, began 
work at Canyon Towers on November 9, 1972 and testif ied that he r e -
ceived a set of p lans f rom the Stangl office through M r . Goldman, p o s -
sibly before he went on the pro jec t . He unders tood, he said, and the 
plans reflected, f rom the day he began work to the day work discontinued 
in late December , that he was to build a b r i ck building (R. 1241, 1243). 
He had, he said, d i rec t and in-depth d iscuss ions with M r . Stangl con-
cerning how the b r ick wal ls would connect with the f loors (R. 1243) and 
how br i ck would be used in connection with the project (R. 1245). 
10. M r . Money, the "job captain" for the a rch i tec t , and the man 
who persona l ly conferred with M r . Stangl (R. 954) and drew the p lans , 
test if ied that by July 29, 1972, the job was essent ia l ly in his hands (R. 946); 
that the drawings showed an eight inch Atlas b r i ck ex te r ior f rom the f i r s t 
moment the m a t e r i a l on the ex te r ior wall was designated (R. 951); that 
he always thought the pro jec t was to have an Atlas b r i ck ex te r io r (R. 951); 
that p r i o r to the Wadsworth study (Ex. 100-D) the in te r io r walls were 
eight-inch At las , changed at Stangl1 s r eques t to eight- inch block, then 
back to eight-inch At las ; that he , Stangl and Wadsworth me t after Septem-
b e r 18, 1972, to set t le the floor and Atlas b r i ck quest ions (R. 979-981); 
and that Stangl d i r e c t e d h im to change the eight- inch Atlas to s ix- inch 
Atlas on the in te r io r wa l l s . He testif ied (R. 1044): 
"What it was i s Stangl came in and asked why wouldn ft a 
six inch do, and th is i s when we got Ralph Wadsworth [ b e -
fore September 18, 1972] involved in i t . And he said it 
would work, a s ix- inch would work on the in t e r io r . So 
then we decided to use i t . " (Emphasis and bracke ted m a -
t e r i a l added) 
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The Tr ia l Court found, contemplating these fac ts , and in the 
face of se r ious contradict ions in the tes t imony, that the t e r m "masonry1 1 
as used in the Construct ion Agreement was understood to mean Atlas 
Br ick (Finding No. 3, R. 1573-1574). 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
PLAINTIFF ASSERTED THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENT AT TRIAL, AND MAY NOT NOW BE 
HEARD TO ASSERT OTHERWISE. 
In the pleadings and at the t r i a l , the Plaintiff-Appellant, M r . 
Stangl, took the posi t ion that the October , 1972 Construct ion Agreement 
was a valid and binding ag reemen t . The Notice of Lien fi led by plaintiff 
(Ex. 5 3 - P and R. 1926) contained the following s ta tement : 
"The indebtedness c la imed hereby acc rued when the F . C. 
Stangl Construct ion Company furnished m a t e r i a l s and labor 
pursuant to an agreement with Burton M . Todd and E. Keith 
Lignel l , entered into on the 18th day of October , 1972, by 
the t e r m s of which F . C. Stangl Construct ion Company agreed 
to p e r f o r m construct ion . . . M (Emphasis added) 
The Complaint, filed by Appellant the same day he r eco rded his Notice 
of Lien, incorpora ted the Notice of Lien, p rayed for $53, 368.41 al leged 
to be due under the l ien p r e m i s e d on the cont rac t , and asked for the f o r e -
c losure of the l ien (Pa r . 5 of Complaint, R. 1924-5). The Respondents , 
D r s . Todd and Lignel l , answered , admitt ing the al legat ions of p a r a g r a p h 
5, that i s , that a Notice of Lien based on the October 18th contrac t had 
been filed (R. 1881), and in the i r Counterc la im (R. 1883) al leged in p a r a -
graph 6 that: 
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"On October 12, 1972, plaintiff and defendants Todd and 
Lignell made and entered into a construct ion agreement 
drafted by plaintiff through his a t to rneys , a copy of which 
is at tached here to as Exhibit A. M 
In his Reply, the Appellant responded to that allegation of the 
Countercla im by admitting that he had entered into the Construction 
Agreement which his counsel had drafted, but cha rac t e r i zed the a g r e e -
ment as "p re l iminary" (R. 1873, P a r . 6). 
The contention in the pleadings that the Agreement was p r e l im ina ry 
was substantially abandoned at the t r i a l , and was in d i rec t contradict ion 
to the express t e r m s of the Agreement , which stated, in Ar t ic le V, the 
following: 
"(Full Agreement) 
The Contract r e p r e s e n t s the full and complete under -
standing between the Owner and the Contractor and, ex-
cept a s express ly provided here in , the Contract may not 
hereaf ter be amended or a l t e red except by p rope r amend-
ment in writ ing executed by the p a r t i e s he re to . n (Ex. 1 - P , 
page 5) 
On the th i rd day of the t r i a l , jus t p r io r to res t ing his case in chief, 
Appellant moved to amend his pleadings as follows (R. 292): 
"MR. YEATES: Your Honor, at th is point in t ime - -
Your Honor, at this t ime p r i o r to r e s t ing , we would move 
pursuant to Rule 15-C of the Utah Rules of Civil P rocedure 
to amend our pleadings to reflect the following: Number one, 
a count in quantum meru i t for the value of the s e r v i c e s , labor 
and m a t e r i a l s pe r fo rmed by M r . Stangl and the F . C. Stangl 
Construct ion Company on the Canyon Road pro jec t . This c la im 
wotald be a s s e r t e d against Doctors Todd and Lignell and no other 
defendants. 
Exhibit A to the Counterc la im i s the exact s ame document as Exhibit A 
to the Complaint except that the original of the Construct ion Agreement (Ex. 1-P) 
which was in the custody of the plaintiff had been dated October 18, 1972, in 
handwriting by sorae unidentified pe r son , and the copy in the custody of the de-
fendants had been dated October 12, 1972 (R. 1888). 
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The c la im would a s s e r t that a contrac t was entered into 
pu r suan t to such. Pur suan t to such contract the work was 
performed on the p r e m i s e s , that as a r e su l t of the t e rmina t ion 
by M r . Stangl and the abandonment of the project , work ceased . 
And that M r . Stangl i s entitled to judgment in the amount of 
$50 ,990 .38 . 
"Th is would be a count in quantum m e r u i t . We think the 
evidence adduced es tab l i shes this c la im in plaintiff1 s p r i m a 
facie case , and that the motion would be made to conform to 
such evidence. 
The second count would be in cont rac t , a s se r t i ng a con-
t r a c t was entered into, that said contract was b reached by 
the t e rmina t ion of the projec t on behalf of the doc to r s , and 
that M r . Stangl is entitled to his damages of p a r t pe r fo rmance 
under said contract in the amount again of $50, 990. 00. M 
L a t e r , on the same day, Appellant withdrew his motion to add the 
quantum meru i t count (R. 302-3), choosing to stand on the contrac t , and 
r e s t ed . The count in quantum m e r u i t was re ins t i tu ted after a conference 
between Court and counsel in chamber s but A p p e l l a n t s c la im based on 
cont rac t was never abandoned. Jus t p r i o r to the c lose of his case , 
Plaintiff-Appellant again, through his counsel, made the following s ta tement : 
"MR, YEATES: . . . On the other hand, I think the Court 
can easi ly find, in fact the evidence before the Court now i s 
that: t h e r e was a contract that was t e rmina ted and b reached . 
And there fore M r . Stangl i s entitled to the value of pa r t p e r -
formance . . . ,f (Emphasis added) (R. 298,299) 
Appellant argued to the T r i a l Court , before the Court found that 
M r . Stangl had b reached the cont rac t , that t h e r e was p e r s u a s i v e and com-
pelling evidence supporting the exis tence of an enforceable con t r ac t , 
b reached , he said, by the Doctors . Appel lant ' s counsel s u m m a r i z e d 
his c la im for the fo rec losure of the l ien in the following t e r m s : 
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"MR. YEATES: . . . we a r e simply foreclosing a 
mechan ic ' s l ien. And I think we have establ ished our p r i m a 
facie e lements for doing it . Number one, the re was a con-
t r ac t , an agreement for s e r v i c e s . M r . Stangl pe r formed 
those s e r v i c e s . Those se rv ices were of reasonable value, 
and now--and that he was t e rmina ted and that pro jec t was 
abandoned.M (R. 301) (Emphasis added) 
also 
"MR. YEATES: Your Honor, if t ha t ' s the Court1 s ob-
ject ion, or t ha t ' s the p rob lem of the Court, I think i t ' s well 
taken. C l e a r l y on the s ta te of the evidence now, what is b e -
fore the Court is a contract , abandoned, and therefore pa r t 
pe r fo rmance . That I cer ta in ly would a g r e e to . M (R. 302) 
(Emphasis added) 
After eight m o r e days of t r i a l , Appel lant ' s counsel again r e i t e r a t ed 
his posit ion respect ing whether a contrac t had been formed. He said: 
"MR YEATES: There is no doubt that t he r e i s a 
contrac t . I don't think t h a t ' s an i s sue . . . " (R. 1383-4) 
(Emphasis added) 
The Tr i a l Court found that the Construct ion Agreement (Ex. 1-P), 
was legally sufficient, c lear and enforceable (Findings Nos. 3, 4, and 5. 
R. 1573-4). 
During the t r i a l and in the a rgument below M r . Stangl al leged that 
the Doctors had breached the Construct ion Agreement by adding to the 
project ce r ta in things which we re not contemplated by the contrac t . As 
can be seen f rom the foregoing quotations, M r . Stangl re ta ined his con-
t r a c t c la im and based what he pe rhaps e r roneous ly descr ibed as a "quan-
tum m e r u i t " al legation on the contract a s wel l . The main th rus t of 
Appel lant 's Brief in th is appeal r e p r e s e n t s a new and different tack, 
d i rec t ly contradic tory to the posit ion taken at t r i a l . It i s that the docu-
ment upon which al l p a r t i e s based the i r c la ims below was not a valid, 
binding and enforceable cont rac t . 
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The author i t ies a r e c lear that a pa r ty may not take a posit ion on 
appeal which is inconsis tent with that taken at t r i a l . The following quo-
tat ion f rom Home-Stake Product ion Company v. R. E. Minnis , J r . , Okl. , 
443 P . 2d 91 , appears to fit the p re sen t con t roversy exactly: 
n [ 1, 2] The f i r s t proposi t ion defendant u r g e s for r e v e r -
sal i s as follows: 
'THE ALLEGED CONTRACT BY WHICH PLAINTIFFS 
SEEK TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR FAILURE TO CONVEY 
OVERRIDING ROYALTY INTERESTS OR FOR SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE IS TOO INDEFINITE, VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN 
TO CONSTITUTE AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. « 
We decline considerat ion of defendant 's a rguments under this 
proposi t ion. As said in Midwest Eng. &c Const . Co. v. 
E lec t r i c Regulators C o r p . , O k l . , 435 P . 2d 89, 100: 'This 
a rgument s eems to be an after thought, and an a t tempt to in-
jec t an i s sue into this appeal not joined at the t r i a l of the ca se . f 
An examination of the r e c o r d in this case readi ly r evea l s that 
ne i ther in de fendan t s p leadings , including i t s c r o s s peti t ion 
for damages against plaintiff on the theory that they had been 
guilty of a b r e a c h of the pa r t i e s 1 contrac t , nor at any stage 
of the t r i a l of this case did it a s s e r t or take the posi t ion that 
said contrac t was void and unenforceable on account of inde-
finiteiness or uncer ta in ty . F u r t h e r m o r e , it cannot deny, on 
the ba s i s of the evidence showing that it acted upon the pa r t i e s 1 
agreement , paid plaintiffs a total sum of $13, 000. 00 for "per 
diem'1 work and expenses under i t , and, at the t r i a l , tendered 
the overr id ing royal t ies sued for, that it cons idered s ame a 
valid, binding, and, at l eas t pa r t i a l ly executed cont rac t . 
Pa r aph ra s ing what we said in Midwest Eng. & Const. C o . , 
supra , we do not think defendant can now be heard to contend 
o therwise . Such contentions a r e obviously disposed of under 
the w rell-established rule stated in the seventh p a r a g r a p h of 
the syllabus in that c a se , as follows: 
'In an appeal of a case to the Supreme Court , the p a r t i e s 
a r e bound by the theo r i e s upon which they t r i ed it in the low-
er court , and cannot secure r e v e r s a l on an e r r o r they invi-
ted t h e r e , or by assuming a posi t ion inconsis tent with that 
taken t h e r e . ' M V 
This cour t has dealt with the subject on two occas ions . In Pet t ingi l l 
v . P e r k i n s . 2 Ut. 2d. 266, 272 P . 2d 185 (1954), a negligence c a s e , i t held: 
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"General ly, appellate cour ts will not review a ground of 
objection not urged in the t r i a l cour t , 3 Am. J u r . 116. 
Appeal and E r r o r , 381. The duty is incumbent upon coun-
sel to give the t r i a l court the opportunity to c o r r e c t the e r -
ro r before asking the appellate court to r e v e r s e a verdic t 
and judgment thereon . F u r t h e r m o r e , it i s well establ ished 
that a pa r ty cannot ass ign a s e r r o r the giving of his own 
r eques t s . He cannot lead the court into e r r o r and then be 
heard to complain thereof. To pe rmi t such action would 
needless ly prolong li t igation, so the re might never be an 
end the re to . Having by his own pleadings , evidence, and 
instruct ion t r i ed and r e s t ed the case upon the theory that 
the m o t h e r ' s negligence would ba r the fa ther , he i s bound 
thereby, as the law of the ca se . He cannot now on appeal 
shift his theory and posi t ion. 3 Am. J u r . , Sections 379, 
253, 371. See a lso Patton v. Evans , 92 Utah 524, at page 
529, 69 P . 2d 969, 1 1 2 A . L . R . 589; Ki rchges tner v. Den-
ver k R. G. W. , Utah 218 P . 2d 685. " (Emphasis added) 
In Davis v. Mulholland, 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P . 2d 834 (1970) th is 
Court held: 
"[ 2] The plaintiff below cla imed that t h e r e was a mutual 
mis take of fact and that the option contrac t should be resc inded. 
The court found against him on this m a t t e r . On the appeal 
plaintiff contends that t he r e was a un i la te ra l mis take on his pa r t . 
Ordinar i ly an appellant cannot change his theory of the case on 
appeal f rom that p resen ted to the court below. " 
In light of a p p e l l a n t s own s ta tements to the court during t r i a l , 
no considerat ion should be given on appeal to Point I of Appe l l an t s 
Brief. Nothing could be c l e a r e r than a p p e l l a n t s s ta tement after 
eleven days of t r i a l that MThere is no doubt that t h e r e is a cont rac t . I 
don ft think tha t ' s an i s s u e . n He cannot now be heard to contend that t h e r e 
was no contrac t . 
Although this a rgument , if accepted by the Supreme Court , would 
be disposit ive of Point I, Respondents will , nonetheless , without waiving 
the a rgument set forth above, respond fur ther to Appel lant 's Point I. 
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Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE 
WAS AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT WHICH WAS BREACHED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
A. Plaintiff 's Counsel P rev ious ly Asse r t ed the Legal Sufficiency 
of the Construction Agreement , 
The s ta tements of counsel and the pleadings below, as set forth 
in Point I of this brief a r e r e f e r r e d to and adopted a s support ive of th is 
point A. 
B. The P a r t i e s Agreed on a Contract P r i c e , 
The plaintiff a l leges that the evidence is Mclear11 that the p a r t i e s 
"never agreed11 on a contract p r i c e . M r . Stangl, however, testif ied that 
t h e r e was an ag reemen t to build a pro jec t which was extensively d i scussed 
(R. 733-4), spoke of "modifications f rom the bas ic agreement1 1 (R. 1405) 
and contended that because the projec t changed, (Stangl deposition, page 
85) without his consent, that the original p r i c e became insufficient (R. 28). 
The re is a vas t difference between the plaintiff1 s p r e s e n t c la im 
that an ag reement was never consummated and the c l a im at t r i a l that 
7 a legally sufficient ag reement was invalidated by subsequent events . 
When the Court ru led that the plaintiff and not the defendants had b reached 
the contrac t (R. 1575), the l a t t e r a rgument b e c a m e untenable on appeal . 
The convoluted reasoning of Point I of the P l a i n t i f f s Brief r e p r e s e n t s 
a semant ic effort to convince this Court that the T r i a l Court1 s legal con-
clusion (i. e. that t h e r e was a Contract) and not i t s factual finding (i. e. 
that the Plaintiff b reached the Contract) i s the m a t t e r at i s sue on appeal . 
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Be that as it may, the tes t imony of the plaintiff, and the argument of 
his counsel (R. 1383-4) confirmed the exis tence of an enforceable con-
t r a c t . 
The Tr i a l Court found that the pa r t i e s agreed to a bas ic p r i c e 
of $2 ,399 ,922 .00 (Findings 3, R. 1573). The T r i a l Court a lso found 
that t he re were some ex t r a s , in addition to the agreed contract p r i ce , 
for which the plaintiff was to be compensated (Finding 5, R. 1574). The 
Court found nothing inconsistent about a fixed contract p r i c e which addi-
t ional cos t s for changes in the work, or ex t r a s , would supplement. 
Neither did plaintiff1 s counsel - - when Art ic le III of the Construct ion 
Agreement was drafted. 
The Doctors were ins is tent that the base projec t should be buil t 
for the agreed p r i c e , or that it should "approximate , lf as the Appellant 
m o r e accura te ly said, the amount of the loan commitment (Appellant 's 
Brief, p . 14). The f igure, $2 ,350 ,000 .00 , was , as the plaintiff co r rec t ly 
documents , to be ent i re ly financed. These considerat ions were d iscussed 
f rom the inception of the projec t and provide support for the cour t ' s 
findings that the p r i ce was f i rm. 
The plaintiff knew as ear ly a s May of 1972, what it appeared the 
defendants would be able to bor row (R. 366). The plaintiff gave his o ra l 
bid in June of 1972 and was advised that a m o r e definite bid, in wri t ing, 
was requi red (R. 368). The i temized bid upon which the July 11 le t te r 
was based was vir tual ly equivalent in amount to the loan commitment 
which was obtained in August. 
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The mor tgage banker , M r . Stoddard, who was at tempting to 
p lace the loan, d i scussed the m a t t e r of the wr i t ten bid with M r . Stangl 
and expressed the urgency for accu ra t e and re l iab le f igures . He was 
delayed, he said, in receiving the requ i red information because the 
plaintiff wanted to recheck the f igures . Because of the magnitude of 
the job, M r . Stoddard said, M r . Stangl told him, respect ing p r i c e , he 
wanted n to be sure on it11 (R. 853-856). The bid for $2, 359, 736. 00,
 s 
which was i temized as to both cos ts and m a t e r i a l s , b roke down as 
$1 2, 894. 00 p e r unit and approximately $1 3. 00 p e r square foot. The 
added i t ems shown on Ex. 12-D brought the f igure up to $2, 399, 222. 00. 
Plaintiff would have th is court bel ieve that defendants and the i r 
counsel considered the contract p r i ce to be $2, 399, 222. 00, ne i ther m o r e 
nor l e s s . This i s a dangerous overs impli f icat ion. Defendants, in the i r 
d iscuss ions with plaintiff and in the l e t t e r f rom the i r a t torney, demanded 
that plaintiff r ecommence per fo rmance of the Construct ion Agreement 
of October 12, 1972, "in full compliance with the t e r m s of the contract 
and i t s assoc ia ted documents and for the p r i ce set forth the re in . M 
(Ex. 56 -P , emphas is added) 
The " p r i c e " se t forth in the Construct ion Agreement , or the 
"cont rac t p r i c e " as plaintiff chooses to call i t , i s 
a. The sum of $2, 399, 222. 00, plus 
b . Any amount expended for ca rpe t , landscaping, sprinkling 
sys tem, and drapes (Items 43 , 51, 52 and 53 in the July 11 le t te r ) in 
excess of the "al lowance" for these i t e m s , plus 
c . Any " e x t r a s " o rde red by the defendants, and plus or minus 
>. - 3 2 - "". 
d. Any "changes" agreed upon by the p a r t i e s . 
The Tr i a l Court found the ex t ras and changes to amount to 
$189,475,00, after full and adequate tes t imony respect ing the i r value. 
Under the t e r m s of the Construction Agreement , these i tems were p a r t 
of the "contract p r i c e " and had to be dealt with in ascer ta in ing damages . 
(1) Defendants were Neither Unwilling Nor Unable to Pay for 
Work Changes Authorized by Them. 
Appellants have repeatedly s t r e s s e d the theme that the Doctors 
never agreed to pay m o r e than $2, 399, 222, ergo, the existence of 
" e x t r a s " es tab l i shes that the Doctors "never agreed on a p r i c e . " 
Appellant 's Brief s t a t e s , re this m a t t e r : 
"However, the r eco rd is c lea r that the defendants never 
agreed to pay m o r e than $2, 399, 222 for the pro jec t . " 
(pg. 13) 
and 
"Nor could this contract p r i ce have been $2, 588, 697 (the 
fixed p r i ce plus the "specified ex t ras" ) because defendants 
by the i r own admiss ion were unable and unwilling to pay 
m o r e than $ 2 , 3 9 9 , 2 2 2 . " (pg. 15) 
After quoting f rom the demand le t t e r which obliged M r . Stangl to 
cons t ruc t the projec t a s r equ i red by the contract "and for the p r i ce set 
forth there in , " the Appel lant ' s Brief fur ther s tated 
"At this t ime (Mar. 1973), the only p r i c e set forth anywhere 
was the p r i c e in the construct ion agreement , $2, 399, 222. " 
(pg. 17). 
These al legations a r e s imply NOT TRUE. The facts and the 
r eco rd of them a r e as follows: 
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1. Section 2 .2 of Ex. 1-P, the Construct ion Agreement , p rov ides 
that "Any deviations f rom the i t ems specified in the le t te r shall cause an 
adjustment in the p r i c e . " 
2. Exibit 1-P, p rov ides , in the port ion of the July 11 le t t e r r e -
f e r r ed to the re in , that I tems 43, 51, 52 and 53 a r e "a l lowances" c l ea r ly 
implying that if any such i t em exceeds the "al lowance" the Doctors will 
pay additional for i t . 
3. Dr . Todd stated he unders tood the "a l lowances" w e r e , jus t that , 
al lowances (R. 1345). 
4 . The en t i re substance of Ar t ic le III of Ex. 1-P deals with 
"Changes in the Work" and the i r effect on the p r i c e . 
5. Ar t ic le IV of Ex. 1 - P provides that the $2, 399, 222 figure is 
"subject to additions or deductions in accordance with p a r a g r a p h 3.1 
[Changes] and the other documents to which this Contract is subject. " 
6. Dr. Todd test if ied that he had ag reed to pay ext ra for the 
ba throoms (R. 408), for the s torage a r e a (R. 408-9 and R. 1353), for 
enlarging the swimming pool (R. 1354), a l a r g e r sauna (R. 1104-5) and 
a fas ter elevator (R. 1105). As p r i ced by the court after hear ing the 
evidence f rom Mar t in J . Chr i s t iansen (Ex. 115-D and page 2 of Ex. 116-D) 
these i t ems amounted to: 
Ba throoms 
Storage a r e a 
L a r g e r swimming pool 
L a r g e r sauna 
F a s t e r e levator 
$111,156.00 
39,877.00 
1,640.00 
190.00 
14 ,600 .00 
$1 67, 463. 00 8 ( o n n e x t P a § e ) 
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The cited port ion of Appellant 's Brief and the reasoning p r e m i s e d thereon 
is dangerously misleading and should be viewed with caution. 
It i s cer ta in that the defendants we re obliged to pay for ex t r a s , 
i t ems they requested which were not provided in the a t tachments to the 
Contract , all d iscussion of 100% financing and of the f igure, $2, 399, 222. 00, 
notwithstanding. The Contract was ent i re ly specific on the point and the 
Doctors so understood and test i f ied. 
The defendants were nei ther "unwilling11 nor "unable11 to pay for 
ex t r a s . The defendants understood that they would have to put some of 
thei r own money into the project (R. 388). The f i r s t " e x t r a s " p receded 
the p repara t ion of the wri t ten Contract . When the plaintiff brought his 
bid to the defendants on approximately July 11 , 1972, he had, Dr . Todd 
said, forgotten severa l i t ems (R. 372). The defendants ag reed to the 
addition of secur i ty doors , an in t e rcom sys tem and f i rep laces at an 
inc reased cost over the bid amount of $39, 486. 00. 
The Doctors made it c lear that t h e r e was over $425, 000. 00 in 
cash, or in readi ly liquidable a s s e t s (R. 713), all of which was avai lable , 
if need be , for the funding of the 30% cash advance requ i red by the Con-
t r a c t when a change was p r iced by Stangl and o rde red by the Doctors . 
No advance was ever reques ted by Stangl, and he never set a p r i ce on 
which the 30% could be p remised , apparent ly because he did not get that 
far in the construct ion before he took his men off the job . 
'
 8 The t r i a l court found the re was a total of $1 89, 475. 00 for ex t ras and 
changes for which the Doctors would have been obligated, had they been 
buil t . By Dr. Todd 's own d i rec t tes t imony he had agreed to pay for 
$167,463 of that sum, and, by Ex. A to Ex. 116-D, he agreed to pay for 
other i t ems ra i s ing the total to $181, 749. 
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The plaintiff, con t r a ry to his p re sen t a rgument on appeal , unde r -
stood that the Doctors could r a i s e additional funds if c i r cums tances r e -
quired. In the proposed "Amendment" to the Construct ion Agreement 
(Ex. 5-D) which was p re sen ted to the defendants with the draft of the p r o -
posed pa r tne r sh ip ag reement in January of 1973, plaintiff sought to "amend" 
the Construction Agreement by charging the p a r t n e r s h i p the additional sum 
of "approximately $200, 000. 00, " two- th i rds of which was to be paid by 
the Doctors . Mr . Stangl a s sumed that the mor tgage could be inc reased , 
that a second mor tgage could be obtained, or that pa r t of the project or 
an in te res t in the pa r tne r sh ip could be sold. All of these options were 
open to r a i s e additional funds, a s the plaintiff unders tood, before any 
consideration of the Doctors pe r sona l r e s o u r c e s was r equ i red . 
C. The P a r t i e s Agreed on the Bas ic E lements of Construct ion. 
The plaintiff a rgues that the evidence i s " c l e a r " that the p a r t i e s 
"never ag reed" about the construct ion m a t e r i a l s and detai ls on the p ro jec t . 
The Contract , a s a consequence, i s c la imed to have been insufficiently 
definite and cer ta in . In effect, that i s an a t tempt to draw legal conclusions 
f rom a set of facts which a r e express ly cont rad ic tory to the T r i a l Cour t ' s 
findings, each of which i s strongly supported by cred ib le evidence in the 
r e c o r d . 
The argument recognizes that the plaintiff made an offer which 
the defendants accepted, and that t he re was a wr i t t en formal iza t ion of 
the p a r t i e s understanding (Appellant's Brief , p . 19). But, it s ays , 
9 Subsection A of Point I says , "The Evidence i s c l ea r that the p a r t i e s 
Never ag reed on a Cont rac t P r i c e . " Subsection B of Poin t I says , "Thus 
the pa r t i e s agreed to build the projec t for the cont rac t p r i c e , but t h e r e was 
yet no agreement about what the building would contain . . . " 
" there was yet no agreement about what the building should contain and 
the agreement of the pa r t i e s was still indefinite and uncer ta in . f l 
The Court found, after weeks of t r i a l , express ly to the con t ra ry . 
It concluded, 
1. That the Construction Agreement requi red the plaintiff 
to construct a 183 Unit apar tment complex with re la ted 
faci l i t ies in accordance with the plans and specfifications 
(Finding 3, R. 1573). 
2. That by the t ime the Construct ion Agreement was exe-
cuted, the pa r t i e s were in substant ial agreement as to all 
m a t e r i a l aspec t s of the buildings to be constructed for the 
fixed p r i ce and plans and drawings had been p r e p a r e d by the 
a rchi tec t and examined by the pa r t i e s (Finding 4, R. 1574). 
3. That the additional plans and m o r e complete detailed 
working drawings which we re developed did not depart f rom 
the understanding the pa r t i e s had as to construct ion and m a -
t e r i a l s at the t ime the Construct ion Agreement was executed 
(Finding 5, R. 1574). 
4 . All m a t e r i a l i t ems had been included in the plans and 
drawings p r io r to the b r each of the Construct ion Agreement 
by the plaintiff (Finding 5, R. 1974). 
M r . Stangl did not complain to Dr . Todd that the plans and speci -
fications did not comply with what he understood he was to build, until 
these proceedings (R. 432-3) . The argument concerning inadequacy of 
the plans was p r epa red for purposes of the l i t igation. It was an effort to 
shift the legal i s sues to a technical bat t leground. 
The pa r t i e s d iscussed the specifications and detai ls of the projec t - -
before agreement was reached . Thei r conversa t ions and the drawings fixed, 
The a rch i tec t , Mr , Molen, said that t he r e we re "occasional object ions" 
to the drawings* When p r e s s e d as to the na ture of the complaints about the 
p lans , and what they contained, M r . Molen could specifically r e m e m b e r an 
objection to the size of the balcony, and though he was sure t he r e w e r e o the r s , 
nothing m o r e (R6 11 89)« 
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M r . Stangl said, in his mind, what the concept of the project was to b e . 
The discussion of specifications and detai ls encompassed the ent i re 
building and involved the Doctors , M r . Stangl and the a rch i t ec t . !,I 
thought, M the plaintiff said, MI had an adequate d iscuss ion so that we al l 
unders tood what we were doing. M (R. 773-4) 
L a r r y Burton, the construct ion foreman, was in d i rec t contact 
with the plaintiff and M r . Goldman about the detai ls of the pro jec t f rom 
the t ime it s ta r ted to the t ime it finished (R. 1237). He was also talking 
with M r . Money about f ldetai ls n (R. 1247). M r . Burton knew nothing of 
the contrived con t roversy over construct ion m a t e r i a l s , detai ls and p l ans , 
and contradicted the tes t imony of his employer in many p a r t i c u l a r s . 
He was , he said, never hampered on the job by what appeared to 
be changes or modifications of the plans (R. 1245). He was confronted on 
the Canyon Towers P ro jec t by p rob l ems al together the s ame or s imi l a r 
to those encountered in the other p ro jec t s on which he had worked. T h e r e 
w e r e no m o r e ambigui t ies on the projec t than on any other (R. 1246-7). 
He was not delayed by the plans (R. 1 242) and was not p r e s s ing M r . Gold-
man or M r . Stangl for m o r e detailed working drawings or specifications 
(R. 1247). 
There were often, he said, numerous detai ls to be decided after 
the s t a r t of a job and, in the Stangl method, t he re was a ce r t a in flexibility 
with r e spec t to such i t e m s (R. 1242-3). He had adequate p lans to p roceed 
at the t ime the pro jec t t e rmina ted (R. 1242), and pe r sona l ly unders tood 
how the pro jec t was to be const ructed, a s did M r . Stangl. As a genera l 
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ru le , on the s i te , M r . Burton said, M r . Stangl was m o r e concerned with 
per formance than p rocedure , for "we a l ready knew how we a r e going to do 
i t . " (R. 1245) 
(1) The Plaintiff Controlled the Evolution of the P l a n s . 
M r . Money, the draf tsman, commenced work on July 11, 1972 
(R. 943), and was p receded on the job by the a r ch i t ec t s , M r . Molen and 
M r . Huss (R. 944). M r . Molen test if ied that M r . Money, general ly 
speaking, a r r i ved on a project when the p r e l i m i n a r i e s were "fixed. " 
(R. 1097). The draf tsman, whose function was m o r e rout ine , rece ived 
his ins t ruct ions f rom the p lanners who were , in this case , the a rchi tec t 
Molen (R. 1097) and the cont rac tor , M r . Stangl. 
The plans for h igh - r i se construct ion a r e l e s s complex than the 
size of such a project sugges ts . The re w e r e , at Canyon Towers , only 
t h r ee kinds of floor p lans . They consis ted , M r . Money said, of drawings 
showing the f i r s t floor in a tower , the second floor and the third floor. 
The plans for f loors t h ree through nine of the one tower, and f loors th ree 
through eleven, of the other tower were simply duplicates (R. 1028). 
M r . Stangl consulted with the a rch i t ec t s regu la r ly concerning the 
plans,, and directed their evolution* He knew exactly what the a rch i tec t s 
were doing (R. 1212). M r . Money reluctant ly admitted that the most 
t r iv ia l kinds of quest ions concerning construct ion detail we re r e f e r r ed to 
M r . Stangl (R. 1099); and that t h e r e were running d iscuss ions with the 
plaintiff f rom Apri l 10 to July 11 , 1972, concerning var ious aspec t s of 
the project (R. 1094). 
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The plaintiff exerc i sed d i rec t and superv i so ry control over the 
draf tsman, who by July 29, was essent ia l ly working alone (R. 946). 
M r . Money took his ins t ruc t ions f rom M r . Stangl, and felt bound 
by M r . Stangl !s "budget. " He "consulted" with Stangl on the type of 
construct ion and on the m a t e r i a l s to be used . He ta i lored his drawings 
to the Stangl budget and added to or subt rac ted f rom the pro jec t when 
so ins t ruc ted by Stangl (R. 973,4) . On a number of occas ions i t ems 
were removed at Stangl1 s reques t (R. 1029). M r . Money did not spend 
a lot of t ime discuss ing detai ls with the Doctors (R. 1030). He said, 
" . . . I had to do what Stangl told me to do to get it into his budget, 
because I rea l ly didn't know how he bid the job. " (R. 1035). In shor t , 
the only "budget" on the Canyon Towers pro jec t was the amount M r . 
Stangl could expend before impinging on his "overhead and profi t . " 
The plaintiff had thoroughly examined and was ent i re ly fami l ia r 
with the plans before executing the Construct ion Agreement , and at all 
t i m e s the rea f t e r . M r . Stangl test if ied that if he w e r e not in M r . Molen ! s 
office daily he was at l eas t t he r e ve ry frequently f rom M a r c h of 1972 
to March of 1973 (R. 52). At different t i m e s he admit ted that he was in 
the Molen office at l eas t weekly f rom Apri l 10 through the t e rmina t ion 
of the project (R. 759), "probably every week, but probably not every 
day"(R. 752), "daily" f rom the f i r s t of August to about Chr i s tmas t ime 
(R. 634, r e fe r r ing to Deposition 102) and "very c lose to dai ly" between 
October 15 and the end of December (R. 633). Plaintiff had steady and 
continuing ciccess (R. 759) to the plans and got what he wanted when he 
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wanted, those that were completed (R, 684). M r . Money kept Mr , Stangl 
cur ren t ly informed as he generated the drawings (R. 1001). 
(2) The P lans , as the Court Found, were Neither Incomplete Nor 
Uncer ta in , 
M r . Stangl received, at F o r t Douglas, in ear ly Apri l of 1972, a 
bas ic drawing which showed the plot plan, the elevation of the building and, 
probably, the floor plan (R« 757). He s ta r t ed pr ic ing the project when he 
got the p re l imina ry sketches (R. 634) and had, by July 11 , i temized both 
m a t e r i a l s and costs in substantial detail (Ex. ! s 12-D, 52 -P) . 
It i s c lear that p re l imina ry plans were sufficiently complete for 
purposes of construct ion for M r . Stangl, who had built 1, 000 p ro jec t s , 
100 of which applied construct ion management , or design as we build, 
p r inc ip les . 
It i s a lso c lear that M r . Stangl, who had es t imated around 1, 500 
pro jec ts (R. 827), could p r i ce construct ion from p re l imina ry p lans . He 
had done p rec i se ly that , he said in the July 11 l e t t e r , 100 t imes with 100% 
success (Ex. 52-P) . 
The plaintiff had adequate plans to p r i c e the projec t long before 
October 15, given the opportunity, which he had, for "init ial par t ic ipat ion 
in the engineering and select ion of specified m a t e r i a l s . M (Ex. 52-P) 
The Court re jected the plaintiff ?s contention, which had i ts roots in the 
con t roversy over Atlas Br ick , that the Doctors changed the bas ic concept, 
or in ter fered with the con t r ac to r ' s control of the projec t . 
'.. • Mr , Stangl was not confined, on October 15, 1972, however, to 
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construct ion or pr ic ing f rom p re l imina ry p l ans . The bas ic construct ion 
i t ems had been d iscussed , Dr . Todd said, before July 11 . The plans 
we re del ivered to the Doctors a s soon a s they we re p r e p a r e d and s o m e -
t i m e s came "smel l ing of ammonia . M Before Exhibit D-9 was p r e p a r e d 
as a single Exhibit, Dr . Todd had rece ived , between August of 1972 and 
the date of i t s del ivery in F e b r u a r y , "p iecemeal , " substant ial ly all the 
plans which it included (R. 431 ,2) . 
M r . Stangl re luctant ly admit ted when confronted with his deposi-
t ion, that the a rch i t ec t s " s t a r t ed rea l ly roll ing on the p l ans" in August 
of 1972. He was , at that t i m e , in daily contact with M r . Molen f s office 
(R. 634). This would have been a min imum of six weeks p r i o r to the 
execution of the Construct ion Agreement . 
M r . Burton, the foreman, had a plan of the en t i re pro jec t when 
he commenced construct ion on November 9, 1972. The foreman seemed 
ent i re ly famil iar with Ex. 78-D, the 35 sheets of drawings p r e p a r e d 
before , but dated November 3, 1972 (R. 1253). M r . Stangl test i f ied that 
he was on the s i te , with his foreman, and p re sumab ly the p lans , "at l ea s t 
once a day, and somet imes m o r e than once. " (R. 17) The plaintiffTs 
s ignature was on Ex. 78-D, the November 3 plans submitted to the 
Planning and Zoning Commiss ion for the n e c e s s a r y p e r m i t s , and he was 
designated cis the "applicant" (R. 820, 824). After cons iderable evasion 
(R. 820-829), the plaintiff admit ted that he probably del ivered these 
p lans to the City (R. 824), on November 9, 1972 (R. 826) or before 
(R. 827), which was approximate ly the day his own workmen commenced 
construct ion (R. 1926). 
^ - 4 2 -
M r . Money testif ied that the r amp drawings, 77--D, which the 
plaintiff 's Brief says were undated, and which consis ted of ten sheets 
of drawings, were Mfully along11 by August 4, 1972, and probably in final 
fo rm by September 1, 1972, at leas t one and a half months before the 
Construction Agreement was executed (R. 949). 
M r . Money es t imated that Ex. 101-D, 17 sheets of drawings 
including layout, floor plans and elevat ions, was p r e p a r e d three to four 
weeks before Ex. 78-D (R. 997), c lear ly p r io r to the execution of the 
Agreement . Exhibits 77-D and 101-D, together , contained 27 sheets 
of drawings, and included the parking r amp , the layout, floor plans and 
elevat ions . 
Exhibit 100-D, engineer Ralph Wadsworth ' s s t ruc tura l analys is 
of the floor sy s t ems , and his compar ison of Atlas Br ick and hollow 
block, was completed September 18, 1972, a month before the Cons t ruc-
tion Agreement (R. 981). Mr . Wadsworth d iscussed the m a t t e r s r a i s ed 
by the study with M r . Stangl both before September 18 and again after the 
s t ruc tura l sys tem was p r epa red (R. 1267). 
As ear ly as June of 1972, the a rch i tec t p r epa red what he then called, 
but l a t e r denied to be , an "Outlined Specification. ,f It was p r epa red for the 
l ender . It set forth, M r . Molen said, Mthe bas ic e s sen t i a l s " of the project , 
including Atlas Br ick (R. 1217). 
The archi tec t dated his plans when the las t sheet was finished in 
i t s ent i re ty and not as the drawings were individually completed. Ex. 78-D 
contained 34 undated sheets and one cover sheet , and the Site Plan which 
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bore the date November 3, 1972. Although the Site P lan drawing (Sheet 
1 of Ex. 78-D) was dated after the October Agreement , it was jus t a 
d r e s sed -up vers ion of the previous Ex. 101-D Plot P lan . The draf tsman, 
between October 15, the approximate date of the Construct ion Agreeraent 
and November 3, the date on Ex. 78-D, coordinated and c r o s s - r e f e r e n c e d 
the number s in the set (R. 1002), a m i n i s t e r i a l t a sk intended to d r e s s up 
the drawings (R. 1003). The set was "checked" so that the city (which 
rece ived the drawings before November 9) would not think it was getting 
an "incomplete set , " M r . Money said. The draf t sman did not r e ca l l and 
could not specify any conceptual changes in the plans between October 15 
and November 3 (R. 1003) and a compar i son of 101-D with 78-D es tab -
l i shes that no significant i t em in con t rover sy between the p a r t i e s was 
a l t e red between October 3-10 (when M r . Money test i f ied 101-D was com-
pleted) and Nov. 3, when the Site P lan por t ion of Ex. 78-D was finally 
completed. During one of the weeks , M r . Money worked only 9 hours 
on the Canyon Road pro jec t . Approximately t h r e e days were spent d r e s -
sing the drawings up and the draf tsman did not know if the r ema inde r of 
his t ime was spent on de ta i l s , the lobby or what (R. 1004). 
The November 3 plans a r e those c loses t in point of t ime to the 
execution of the Contract . They included 35 sheets of drawings and added 
to the plans which p receded them, only a specification and m o r e detai l . 
The re fe rence in the Contract to "speci f ica t ions" (para . 2. 2) l ikely had 
r e g a r d to the specifications included in the November 3 p lans , since the 
plaintiff, a t whose di rect ion the Contract was p r e p a r e d , apparent ly , a c -
cording to the a rch i tec t , had knowledge of none other (R. 1217). 
;
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The specifications on the Canyon Towers project were contained 
in the plans and drawings before formal specifications were prepared. 
A person who knew how to read plans could acquire the same information 
included in the later specifications (Ex. 10-D) from reading the plans 
(R. 1022) . 
The plaintiff claims to have prepared his bid on July 11, and la te r 
on October 12, f rom preliminary plans and specifications (Point B - l , 
App, fs Brief), Whatever the state of the plans on October 15, he says , 
the parties were to work together to prepare final plans and specifications, 
an act which was to occur in the future, "clearly requiring the future agree-
ment" of the parties (App. fs Brief, p. 26, 27). Presumably, if the parties 
could not agree, such a view consigned the Doctors to the ownership of 
half a building and permitted the Contractor to collect the reasonable value 
of his serv ices . If such logic were in fact applied, there could be no con-
struct ion project built by the plaintiff on construct ion management principles, 
the performance of which he could not avoid on the same theory. Eighty 
percen t of Mr . Stangl !s work, Mr . Molen testified, was done on a construc-
tion management basis (R. 1162). 
The Court found that the parties agreed on the essential elements of 
the project before they signed the Contract* The plans p repa red by the 
architect were, it said, adequate for their purposes, examined by the par-
t ies and part of the Contract by i ts express t e r m s . 
The Construction Agreement made various references to "Plans 
and Specifications, " (Ex. 1-P, pg« 1) "final drawings" (Ex. 1-P, pg. 2), 
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"P l ans , Specifications and Drawings" (pg. 6) and "Drawings and Specifi-
ca t ions" (pg. G. C. 1). Respecting these i t ems it should be noted that: 
(1) Ar t ic le I, Section 1.1 (e)(2) provides that the t e r m "Cont rac t" 
means the Construct ion Agreement itself, Genera l Conditions, Supple-
menta ry General Conditions, the P lans and Specifications as developed, 
and change o r d e r s , 
(2) Section 2. 2 provides that the Contrac tor , Archi tec t and Owner 
shall "work together in p repa ra t ion of final drawings . " 
(3) General Conditions, Ar t ic le 1(a) provides 
"The Contract cons is t s of the Agreement , the Genera l 
Conditions of the Contract , the Supplementary General Con-
dit ions, the Drawings and Specifications, including all modi -
fications thereof incorpora ted in the documents before the i r 
execution, the working drawings to be completed by Archi tec t 
and Contrac tor , and all change o r d e r s p rope r ly executed. 
These form the Con t r ac t . " (Emphasis added) 
(4) General Conditions Ar t ic le 3 provides for the Archi tec t to 
furnish drawings and ins t ruct ions 
ii * >\< >\< consis tent with the Contract Documents , t r ue develop-
ments thereof, and reasonably inferable t he re f rom. " 
The p lans , drawings and specifications were in fact p r e p a r e d . 
The Contrac tor , Archi tect and Owner did in fact work together and evolve, 
i s sue and exatmine full P l ans and Specifications as set forth in the final 
and complete Exhibits 9-D and 10-D. A m o r e fully detai led ana lys i s 
of the drawings developed than i s contained on page 29 of A p p e l l a n t s 
Brief r evea l s the following: 
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Exh ib i t 
No . S h e e t s 
1 . 6 -D 4 
2 . 7 -D & 5 ea . 
7-D(A) 
3 . 7 7 - D 10 
4 , 101 -D 17 
5 . 1 0 0 - D 
7 8 - D 35 
8-D 37 
8. 9 - D 71 
C o n t e n t s Shown 
P l o t p l a n , one f loor p l a n 
and e l e v a t i o n s and g a r a g e 
P l o t p l a n , f loor p l a n s f o r 
u n i t s , e l e v a t i o n s and g a r a g e 
F u l l r a m p d r a w i n g s , d e s i g -
n a t e d 2R, 3R, e t c . 
P l o t p l a n , d e t a i l of a l l 
f l o o r s , a p a r t m e n t s , e l e v a -
t i o n s , d e t a i l of k i t c h e n s , d e -
t a i l of U n i t s A, B , C and D 
double s t a i r w a y , e t c . 
W a d s w o r t h s tudy d a t e d Sep t . 
19, 1972 and showing A t l a s 
b r i c k and p r i c e s 
F u l l s e t of i n t e r i o r and e x -
t e r i o r p l a n s and d e t a i l s n u m -
b e r e d a s to s h e e t s . C o n t a i n s 
1 0 1 - D ( 1 7 p g s . ) , 7 7 - D (6 pgs . ) , 
s t r u c t u r a l d r a w i n g s (5 p g s . ) , 
two e l e v a t i o n d r a w i n g s , a roof 
p l a n , g r a d i n g p l a n and a m a t e r -
i a l s l i s t (1 pg 9 e a . ) and two 
d r a w i n g s expanded f r o m E x . 
1 0 1 - D . 
C o n s i s t s of E x . 7 8 - D wi th i n -
t e r i o r w a l l s c h a n g e d b a c k t o 
A t l a s b r i c k , p l u s 2 m e c h a n i c a l 
d r a w i n g s . 
T h e f ina l a c c u m u l a t i o n of 
d r a w i n g s in to a c o m p l e t e s e t . 
I n c l u d e s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n l a t e r 
e x t r a c t e d to m a k e u p E x , 1 0 - D 
(the S p e c i f i c a t i o n s ) . 
Da t e P r e p a r e d 
M a r . 18 , 1972 
M a y 6, 1972 
M o s t l y b e f o r e Aug . 
4 , 1972. E n t i r e l y 
by Sep t . 1, 1972 
(Money, R. 949) 
P r o b a b l y p r i o r to 
Sep t . 18 , 1 9 7 2 , n ( P - 4 8 ) 
C e r t a i n l y no l a t e r 
t h a n Oct* 3 to 10, 
I 972 .12 (p. 48) 
On o r b e f o r e Sep t . 
18, 1972. 
R a m p d r a w i n g s , d u r -
ing Aug . 1972 . (5 p g s . ) 
F u l l i n t e r i o r and e x -
t e r i o r d r a w i n g s i d e n -
t i c a l to 1 0 1 - D c o u n t e r -
p a r t s (17 p g s . ) , b e f o r e 
Sep t . 18 , 1972. S t r u c -
t u r a l , roof and g r a d i n g 
p l a n s (7 p g s . ) b e t w e e n 
O c t . 3 r d and Nov. 3 , 
1972 . 
22 p g s . by Sept . 1 8, 
1972 . 13 p g s . by 
Nov. 3 , 1972 . 2 d r a w -
i n g s and c o r r e c t i o n s 
b y Nov . 2 1 , 1972 , t h e 
d a t e of d e l i v e r y of 7 8 - D 
to R o z e m a . 
C o m p l e t e d b y f i r s t 
p a r t of w e e k of D e c . 
16, 1972 . No new c o n -
c e p t s added a f t e r t h i s . 
D r a w i n g s i n c l u d e d 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s b y t h i s 
t i m e . (Money, Re 1 0 2 1 -
2) . 
Money testif ied that after the f i r s t pa r t of the week of December 16, 
1972, the work was jus t policing up the drawings and wri t ing the spec i -
fications f rom the drawings . (R. 1021-2). Exhibits 9-D and 10-D w e r e 
actually del ivered to the p a r t i e s in the i r completed fo rm about F e b r u a r y 
6, 1973 - - but they had been p r e p a r e d in every m a t e r i a l r e spec t , with 
Stangl r egu la r ly informed as they were genera ted (R. 1001), by mid-
December of 1972. 
Two dates a r e especial ly significant with re la t ion to the s ta te of 
the plans and specificat ions, thei r content at the t ime of the signing of 
the Construct ion Agreement (variously r e f e r r e d to in the tes t imony as 
Oct. 12, Oct. 15 and Oct. 18) and the i r content a s of J anua ry 25, 1973, 
when Stangl made up the 1 /25 /73 bid (Ex. 1 3-D) amounting with profit 
and overhead to $2, 970, 450. 00. As to the l a t t e r i tem, the s ta te of the 
plans in January , 1973, the r e c o r d shows that all but policing up the d raw-
ings and extracting the specifications f rom them for a r r angemen t a s a 
separa te document had been completed by the week of December 16, 1972 
M r . Stangl complained to Money and Molen when he saw the plans that 
the in te r io r walls should be block, not Atlas b r i ck . Money then changed 
the in te r io r plans to show block. Wadsworth was then consulted and made 
the study which is Ex. 100-D. This was done by September 18, 1972. 
When Wadsworth made his study, Money testified (R. 1043) "we decided 
to change the block back to b r i ck . ,! Money thought th is was in December , 
but other tes t imony showed the Wadsworth study to have been in Septem-
b e r . Since 101-D contains block in te r io r wa l l s , it mus t have been drawn 
before the Sept. 18 study and conference with Wadsworth in which Atlas 
b r i ck was decided upon by Stangl and Money. 
12 
Money said 101-D was p r e p a r e d 3-4 weeks p r i o r to Ex. 78-D (R. 997). 
La te s t drawing in 78-D is dated Nov. 3, 1972. 
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(Money, R. 1021-2) and that the information contained in Ex. 10-D 
(the final wri t ten specifications) was a l ready in Ex. 9-D (the final, 
total , complete drawings (R* 1022)). A p p e l l a n t s counsel , M r . Yeates , 
c lear ly summar ized the facts r e the J anua ry 25, 1973, s tate of the plans 
as follows (R. 1508, 1509): 
"The Janua ry 25 was p r e p a r e d before the final i t ems 
w e r e del ivered, but the tes t imony at l eas t as we argue it , 
is that by January 25, when he p r epa red the Janua ry 25 bid, 
the plans were not only in substant ial ag reement , but in total 
agreement with D-9, which was jus t del ivered, you know, 
pr in ted and del ivered. M (Emphasis added) 
As to the fo rmer , the s tate of the plans at October 15, 1972, the 
Construction Agreement at Genera l Conditions, Ar t ic le 1 (a), supra , 
provides that all modifications of the Agreement , the General Conditions, 
the Supplemental General Conditions and the Drawings and Specifications 
incorpora ted in them before the execution of the Agreement plus all 
drawings to be completed a r e p a r t of the Contract . At the t ime the Con-
st ruct ion Agreement was signed, the following had been drawn and decided 
on: 
1. Ful l r a m p drawings (Ex. 77-D); 
The s tate of the plans by Janua ry 25, 1973, can be fixed extr ins ical ly 
by an examination of the t ime r e c o r d s of the men who p r e p a r e d the draw-
ings . Ruffel, Hughes, Money and Huss a r e the only ones who worked on 
the drawings after July 11 , 1972 (R. 944). Molen was p r e sen t a half day 
but a s a superv i so r , not a draf tsman. The t ime sl ips show that by Janu-
a r y 25, 1973: 
(a) Ruffell had completed 100% of his work (Ex. 99-D). 
(b) Hughes had completed all of his work by September , 1972, ex-
cept for a l i t t le t ime in March , 1973 - - after Ex. 9-D and 10-D 
completed (Ex. 97-D). 
(c) Money had completed 95% of his work (Ex. 96-D). 
(d) Huss put in 11-1 /2 hours on the pro jec t between January 25, 1973 
and del ivery of Exs . 9-D and 10-D. (Ex. 98-D) 
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2. Drawings of the f loors , and the Atlas b r i ck supporting them. 
(Ex. 100-D); 
3. Drawings of each and every one of the 22 f loors , the a r r a n g e -
ment and in te r ior detai ls of each apar tment , the e levat ions , 
the ent i re ex te r io r , the lobby, s torage a r e a , bath and kitchen 
deta i l s , c r o s s - s e c t i o n s , both s t a i r c a s e s , e tc . , a s shown in 
Ex. 1 0 1 - D ; 1 4 
4. That port ion of the 13 pages added to 101 -D between September 
18, 1972 and October 15, 1972 to make up Ex. 78-D. All 1 3 
were completed in full by Nov. 3, 1972, the las t date on Ex. 
15 78-D. 
5. Agreement had been reached to change the in te r io r wal ls back 
to Atlas b r i ck (Wadsworth study and tes t imony and Money t e s t i -
mony) which was in fact l a t e r on done; 
So, by the t ime the Construct ion Agreement was executed it included 24 
pages of text , 22 pages of drawings , including the en t i re in te r io r and ex-
1 4 The pa r t of the P l ans dealing with the i t ems c la imed in Stangl 's "L i s t 
of 45n ,and resolving the i s s u e s as to which of Stangl 's c la imed "additions11 
were a l ready incorpora ted by re fe rence into the Construct ion Agreement 
when signed,,are contained in the 17 shee ts of 101-D and the 6 sheets of 
r a m p drawings , duplicates of which make up the major p a r t of 78-D. 
15 A physical compar i son of 101-D and 78-D revea l s that the 13 pages 
genera ted after Oct. 3rd consis ted of 5 s t ruc tu ra l shee t s , a m a t e r i a l s 
l i s t , a roof plan, a grading plan, 2 additional side views to supplement 
the view a l ready in 101 -D and a d r e s s e d up Site P l a n . These a r e not the 
a r e a s involved in the p r e - O c t . 15th v s . pos t -Oct . 15th con t roversy . The 
con t roversy i s resolved in the p r e - O c t . 3rd por t ion (23 p g s . ) of 78-D. 
M r . Money said he actually changed the in te r io r wall drawings back 
to Atlas Br ick some t ime after Sept. 19, 1972, and p r io r to Nov. 21, 1972 
(R. 964). 
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terior plans, plus lobby, storage, r a m p s and rec rea t ion areas , and a 
portion of 13 additional pages of drawings. Thereafter, the conduct of 
the pa r t i e s was such that by the week of December 16 they had evolved 
all of the rest of the information comprising the total Plans and Specifi-
cat ions , By January 15, 1973, Mr . Stangl had formed and communicated 
his intent to abandon the project and by January 25, 1973, Mr . Stangl bid 
the work on what was then the total information contained in Exhibits 9-D 
and 10-D at a price of $2, 970,450,, 00. By the i r act ions the pa r t i e s 
affirmed what the trial court decided. There was a full and complete 
contract between the pa r t i e s reflected in writing and comprised of Exs. 
1-P, 9-D and 10-D. The added plans and more complete detailed working 
drawings did not depart from the understanding of the parties at the t ime 
the Contract was made. 
D. The Contract was Breached by the Appellant. 
Appellant argues (Appellant1 s Brief, page 10) that nei ther the fact 
of breach nor the time of breach is fixed by the evidence. This argument 
i s without merit . -
The first breach of the Construction Agreement took place in mid-
January , 1.973, It consisted of the following: • - * 
(a) Stangl ceased to perform the construction in December , 1972, 
and did not recommence at any time thereafter. Particularly, he failed 
to recommence in January when the weather permit ted* (Dr, Todd R.419, 20) 
(b) Stangl, through his construction supervisor, Goldman, assigned 
Burton, the construct ion foreman, to a different job, not Canyon Towers 
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(Burton R. 1249, 50).This would support an implicat ion of abandonment 
when coupled with the fai lure to ever put Burton, or any other foreman, 
back on this job. 
(c) Stangl formed and stated an intention to abandon const ruct ion. 
He told Burton, "That i s it on Canyon Towers , " and did so, according to 
Burton, in the f i r s t two weeks of January , 1973 (R. 
(d) Stangl demanded a 1/3 pa r t ne r s h ip in t e re s t as the p r i c e of 
recommencing the construct ion, a s shown by 
(1) His s ta tement to Molen that he wouldn ft build the projec t 
unless he got "a piece of the act ion" (R. 424); 
(2) His s ta tement to Dr . Todd, about January 15, 1973, proposing 
pa r tne r sh ip ; 
(3) Having his a t torney p r e p a r e the documents amending the 
Construct ion Agreement and creat ing the pa r tne r sh ip (Exs. 
5-D and 6-D); and 
(4) His s ta tement to Dr. Lignell and his conduct at the Janua ry 25, 
1973, meet ing where he refused to d i scuss anything but the 
pa r tne r sh ip concept. 
Respondents contend the intention not to p e r f o r m , formed and 
stated by m i d - J a n u a r y , 1973, coupled with the conduct of ceasing to p e r -
17 
form equals a b r each of the contract to build. The t r i a l cour t so found. 
The evidence sustaining that finding i s m o r e than jus t sufficient, or c red ib le , 
it is compell ing. 
Finding 9, R. 1575. 
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e
 The Lower Court Correc t ly Handled Problems Related to 
"Changes in the Work. M 
The plaintiff a rgues on appeal that the lower court* without any 
evidence of assent by the parties, created an agreement about "extras" 
when none existed. 
The argument that the project was changed without the plaintiff's 
consent was intended to obscure the real reason for the plaintiffs default, 
c a r e l e s s bidding, The plaintiff was more honest at the January , 1973 
meeting, when he f i r s t informed Dr. Todd that he did not intend to p e r -
forin for the p r i ce to which he had agreed. He said then, according to 
the Doctor, "These costs are coming up in a lot higher than I expected 
them t o . " (R. 421) • 
The defendants attempted, prior to the trial, to determine the 
factual basis for the plaintiff's claim that the project had changed. Less 
than half of the 45 changes in the work alleged by the plaintiff at the t r i a l 
could be identified by him when his deposition was taken in 1 973, despite 
the fact that he was intensively questioned on that precise point over a 
period of several days. 
It i s apparent that the Court, as the finder of fact, did not find the 
plaintiff*s evidence as to the "changes" compelling. By comparison to the 
l i s t of 45 i tems which the plaintiff asserted, under oath, to have enlarged 
the project, the changes and extras actually found by the Court were few 
in number. 
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The so-ca l led "extras1 1 were i t ems the plaintiff said changed the 
project ; i t ems to which, he said, he had not ag reed on July 11 , 1972, or 
l a t e r , when the Construction Agreement was signed, on October 15. The 
Tr i a l Court ul t imately t r e a t e d the al leged ex t ra s as a m a t t e r of defense 
and put the burden for the proof of the i r existence and value on the r e luc -
tant and uncooperat ive plaintiff. They w e r e , a s will be explained, an 
offset to the defendants1 c la im for damages which was m e a s u r e d by the 
cost of completion of the pro jec t . 
The plaintiff 's b r e a c h of contract in te r rup ted the pe r fo rmance of 
the work. At the t ime of the b reach , t h e r e w e r e , contained in the p lans , 
"ce r t a in specified ex t ra s for which plaintiff was to be compensated by 
defendants in addition to the agreed sum of $2, 399, 222. 00. n (Finding 
5, R. 1574). Changes in the work were ant icipated by the Contract 
18 ( 3 . 1 , Ex. P - l ) and common in the indust ry (R. 692-3). 
The c la im of the plaintiff a t t r i a l was that t h e r e we re changes in 
the concept of the projec t which invalidated the a g r e e m e n t . The t r i a l 
cour t did not flinch in the face of an enormous m a s s of technical detai l . 
It re jec ted the contention and specifically found, adverse ly to the plaintiff, 
that the pro jec t had not ma te r i a l l y changed f rom i ts or iginal conception 
(Finding 5, R. 1574). 
The c la im of the plaintiff on appeal i s that t h e r e was no a s sen t 
to the ex t ras and that they w e r e not authorized as technical ly requ i red 
by p a r a g r a p h 3.1 of the Contract . 
1 O 
Which provided that changes "in the na tu re of addi t ions, delet ions, and 
modif icat ions" could be made "without invalidating the Contract . " ( 3 . 1 , 
Ex. P - l ) 
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If the plaintiff had per formed under his contracts he would have 
been entitled to payment for changes in the work, or under no obligation 
to make such changes. The additions to the projec t would have been o r -
dered in writ ing by the a rchi tec t and would have resul ted , if they had 
involved an adjustment in the contrac t p r i c e , in !fa credi t or a charge11 
to the Owner, subject to the "mutual agreement of the p a r t i e s . M An 
i n c r e a s e in the cost of the project would have requi red the payment , by 
the Owner to the Contractor , of 30% of the cost of the change, in advance. 
The application of the cont rac t s provis ions for "changes in the work" 
was , however, in ter rupted by the plaintiff 's b r e a c h of his own contract 
"without jus t cause or excuse" (R. 1575) before the envisioned changes 
were o rde red or p r i ced . The Court was unwilling to a s s u m e , where the 
plaintiff b reached before the changes w e r e p r iced , authorized in writ ing, 
paid in advance^ or built , that the ag reement was indefinite and uncer ta in . 
To say so would have pe rmi t t ed the pa r ty who breached to avoid the 
consequences of his default by r eason of the application of a set of condi-
t ions , the per formance of which his own conduct made imposs ib le . 
After the i s sues of b r e a c h were reso lved against the plaintiff, the 
" e x t r a s " contained in the plans as of J anua ry 25, 1973, were important 
only in r ega rd to the determinat ion of damages . They became a credi t 
and an offset to the plaintiff who was benefited, r a t h e r than penal ized, 
by thei r identification and valuation. 
F . The T r i a l Cour t ' s Findings Should be Upheld on Appeal. 
The Contractor a l leges , as a factual m a t t e r , that the plans and 
specifications were not sufficiently complete on October 15, 1972, to allow 
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the inference that they somehow embodied the p a r t i e s unders tanding. 
(Appellants Brief, 25-6.) Where t h e r e is a dispute in the evidence, th is 
Court has repeatedly supported the findings of the T r i a l Court , assuming 
that 
" . . . the T r i a l Court believed those aspec t s of the 
evidence, and drew the inferences which could fa i r ly and 
reasonably be drawn there f rom, which tend to support the 
findings and judgment; . . . M (Emphasis suppl ied.) Casey 
v. Nelson B r o t h e r s Construct ion Company, 24 Utah 2d 14, 
465 P . 2d 173 (1970). See a lso : Winger v. Gem State 
Mutual of Utah, 22 Utah 2d 132, 449 P . 2d 982. 
If upon the review of the r eco rd , t he r e is a r easonab le ba s i s in 
the evidence to support the court1 s findings, they will , of cou r se , not 
be d is turbed. B a r r e t t v. Vickers , 24 Utah 2d 334, 471 P . 2d 1 5 7 . 1 9 
There i s , on this r e co rd , competent tes t imony supporting all of the 
Court1 s c r i t i ca l factual findings. The Tr ia l Court made i ts findings, 
which were adve r se to the plaintiff, after hear ing disputed and cont ra -
dictory tes t imony f rom the p a r t i e s . This Court has frequently indicated 
that where competent evidence supports the fact f inders conclus ions , it 
cannot "subs t i tu te" i t s judgment for that of the T r i a l Court , even if it 
d i s ag ree s with the findings. P i t che r v. Laur i t zen , 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 
P . 2d 491 . 
An action for b r e a c h of contract is an action at law, r a the r than equity. 
Flynn v. Schocker Construct ion Co. , 23 Utah 2d 140, 459 P . 2d 433. In 
an action at law, the appellate court does not r e v e r s e on i s sue s of fact 
where the T r i a l Cour t ' s findings a r e supported by the evidence or the 
absence of i t . Mar t in v. Mar t in , 29 Utah 2d 413, 510 P . 2d 1102. 
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G. The Plaintiff1 s Authori t ies a r e Inapplicable to the F a c t s Upon 
Which the Tr ia l Court Ruled. 
The Plaintiff cited cases in support of the following legal pr inc ip le : 
11
 As a p r o m i s e may insufficiently specify the p r i c e to 
be paid, so the considerat ion for which the p r i c e is to be 
paid may be left equally uncer ta in , and in such a case it i s 
not usual ly poss ib le to invoke the s tandard of reasonab leness 
in o rde r to give the p r o m i s e sufficient definiteness to make 
it enforceable.11 (Appellant 's Brief, quoting Williston, p . 20) 
With that p r inc ip le , a s an abs t r ac t proposi t ion, the defendants have 
no a rgument . The Tr ia l Court , however, found, as a factual proposi t ion, 
that the na ture of the requ i red per formance in the instant case was not 
uncertain,, 
Citing Robinson and Wilson, Inc. v. Stone, 110 CaL R p t r . , 35 
CaL Apps 3d 396 (App. ss Brief, p . 20), the plaintiff d iscussed in extensive 
detail a contract provis ion entitled "COMPLETION OF UNDESIGNED 
INTERIORS. M P r e sumab ly , the factual c i r cums tances a r e considered 
equivalent to the c i r cums tances at Canyon Tower s . Again in Klimek 
v. P e r i s i c h , 371 P . 2d 956 (Ore. 1962), the i s sue i s in te r io r renovation 
on a project where t h e r e were MNO,f p lans or specif icat ions. The other 
ca se s cited, which a r e var ia t ions on the same t h e m e , a r e a 191 0 Idaho 
c a s e
* Nave v, McGrane , 19 Id. I l l , 113 p . 82, Cannady v. Mar t in , 98 
SW 2d 1009 (Tex. App*), a 1936 case (no plans and specifications and 
only an ora l ag reement to build), and Colorado Corp . v. Smith (CaL App. 
1953) 263 P . 2d (where a contract for the construct ion of r e s idences did 
not specify how many res idences we re to be const ructed , their s ize , 
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type, location, cost or appearance - or any other detai ls of const ruct ion) . 
In each of the c a s e s , the higher court de te rmined that the a g r e e -
ment was indefinite, uncer ta in and unenforceable . The t ru ly exaggerated 
factual c i r cums tances of those c a s e s , and the unifying legal pr inc ip le , 
which they purpor t to support , s imply do not apply to the vast ly different 
conditions which existed in October of 1972 at Canyon Road. 
At Canyon Towers the in te r ior of the projec t was not "undesigned. n 
There w e r e plans and specifications in existence which the Court found, 
on the bas i s of substantial and compelling evidence, to have defined the 
na tu re of the project to be built with g rea t cer ta in ty and exact i tude. 
(See this Brief pp.41 to 51 and the plans and drawings t hemse lves , 
respect ing this point . ) 
H. The Defendants did not In te r fere with Any Rights Reserved to 
the Plaintiff Under the T e r m s of the Construct ion Agreement . 
The plaintiff a rgues that he r e s e r v e d to himself the r ight to specify 
20 
the m a t e r i a l s to be used on the Canyon Towers P r o j e c t . However, the 
r ight to specify m a t e r i a l s was l imited by the Contract which provided that , 
"Cont rac tor , Archi tec t and Owner shall work together in 
p repara t ion of final drawings and with the approval of Archi tec t 
and Owner, Contractor shall have the r ight to specify m a t e r i a l s 
to be used . n 
and 
"The le t te r at tached here to as Exhibit " C " with i t s a t tached 
cost breakdown se ts forth types of m a t e r i a l s to be specified in 
the final p lans and working drawings . . . n (Emphasis supplied 
2 .2 , Ex. P - l 
The Contract , which was amended by the Doctors in only two p a r t i c u l a r s , 
did not provide that the Contractor had an uncontrol led d i sc re t ion with r e g a r d 
to the specification ot m a t e r i a l s . One of the amendments made by the Defen-
dants provided that the r ight to specify m a t e r i a l s was subject to "the approval 
of the Archi tec t and Owner. M (2. 2, Ex. P - l ) 
CQ 
In other words , the le t te r fixed the types of materials to be used 
on the project and deviations f rom the i tems specified affected both the 
contractor and the owners* The plaintiff could not change the materials 
on the base project, for his discretion to specify materials was limited 
by the items selected in the July 11 l e t t e r and the requisite approval of 
Architect and Owner. The defendants could not change the m a t e r i a l s with-
out incurring additional costs , because, 
MAny deviations f rom the i tems specified in the le t te r 
shall cause an adjustment in the price, as set forth on the 
attachment, !l (Emphasis supplied, 2 .2 , Ex. P - l ) 
Mr. Stangl claims that the Doctors interfered with 
1. His right to specify materials , and, 
2. His r ight to control the evolution of the detailed working 
drawings. 
The Trial Court wisely rejected both contentions. 
As to the la t te r contention, the re was substant ial , competent evi-
dence that the plaintiff saw the architect with regularity in a design con-
sultation capacity as envisioned by the agreement, and that he exercised 
control over the plans that were drawn. 
As to the first contention, Dr. Todd testified that he contracted 
for a solid brick building, inside and out. Mr. Stangl testif ied that he 
agreed to build the project with block (R. 774). The defendants refused 
to use block and M r . Stangl said the refusal violated his r ight to specify 
the materials . 
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The Contractor argued that the t e r m s "masonry wal l -bear ing 
s t r uc tu r e " in the July 11 le t t e r , Exhibit 52 -P , and "mason ry" under 
i t em 13 of the Bid, Exhibit 12-D, r e f e r r ed to block. Those i s sue s were 
squarely resolved against the plaintiff at the t r i a l , the Court stating: 
"The ambiguity r a i sed by the t e r m "masonry bear ing 
wal l" in the Construction Agreement i s resolved, after the 
introduction of paro l evidence, against the plaintiff. The 
said t e r m had re fe rence , at al l per t inent t i m e s , solely 
and exclusively to the m a t e r i a l known as Atlas Br ick , " 
(Conclusion 4, R. 1577) 
As previous ly indicated, the Appellant1 s Brief i s , for all p rac t i ca l 
pu rposes , ent i re ly silent on the subject of Atlas Br ick . The omiss ion of 
any re fe rence to the Atlas Br ick con t roversy i s a s i lent but powerful 
r eminder of M r . Stangl !s vulnerabi l i ty on an i s sue of cen t ra l impor tance . 
In the absence of the con t roversy over b r i ck , which was unmistakably 
reso lved against the plaintiff in overwhelming fashion, the al legat ions 
that the defendants in te r fe red with the plaintiff1 s r ight to specify m a t e r i a l s 
a r e genera l i t ies which a r e nei ther specific nor supported by the r eco rd . 
The argument was t a i lo red for Atlas Br ick and Atlas Br ick is gone. 
The Court did not find that the conduct of the defendants violated 
any d iscre t ion or infringed any right conferred upon the plaintiff by the 
t e r m s of the ag reement . 
I. The Construct ion Agreement was Neither Indefinite Nor P r e -
l iminary and it did not Constitute an Agreement to Agree . 
The plaintiff seemed to have unders tood that the Canyon Road 
pro jec t was to be 100% financed and that the bas ic contrac t p r i c e was 
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governed by the amount of money avai lable . (App. ! s Brief, p . 13-15) 
Yet, he put in the July 11, 1972, le t te r what appeared to be ex-
culpatory language. "As you know, it is impossible to give an exact bid 
to construct anything without having exact plans to c o r r e l a t e the cos ts to 
the object being purchased . M (Ex. 52-P) But, he was quick to add, by 
using the "construct ion management method" he had given prospec t ive 
owners , "p re l imina ry" proposa l s indicating a bas ic type of construct ion 
project over 100 t imes holding 100% of the t ime to the budget projected. 
He had done this by defining the "bas ic" project and through his " ini t ia l" 
p repara t ion in the engineering and select ion of "specified" m a t e r i a l s . 
(Ex. 52-P) 
On October 15, 1972, t h r ee months l a t e r , the plans of the Canyon 
Towers Pro jec t were at an advanced s tage. Between July 11 and October 
15, 1972, the drawings had mate r i a l ly inc reased in both size and definition 
and included full and complete drawings of the in te r ior and exter ior of the 
project (Ex. 101-D). On November 9, 1972, the plaintiff, who had waited 
for the completion of demolition by a subcontrac tor , put his own c rews on 
the project for the f i r s t t ime (R. 1926). Six days p rev ious , Ex. 78-D, 
which contained 35 sheets of p lans , had been completed in i ts ent irety 
and del ivered to Stangl. It showed all m a t e r i a l aspec t s of the building 
and was personal ly signed by Stangl and t r ansmi t t ed by him to the City 
for a pe rmi t . 
The defendants were never advised by the plaintiff that the a r r a n g e -
ments in the Construct ion Agreement were intended to be of a p r e l im ina ry 
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nature, that any subsequent agreement was envisioned, or that there 
were any conditions precedent to its execution. The Agreement, unlike 
the July 11 letter, which suggested that it was "a preliminary proposal, " 
specified particularly in Article V that it was the "Full Agreement11 
between the part ies . (See Ex. 1 -Pandpg . 25 of this Brief.) 
To the October agreement, the July letter became a mere exhibit. 
The July 11 letter was not a set of plans and did not take the place of 
plans. The plans and specifications "as developed, " were a part of the 
Construction Agreement by definition. (1.1 Ex. P - l ) 
The plaintiff prepared his contract price, he said, on the basis 
of preliminary plans and specifications. Unlike the July 11 letter , how-
ever, the Construction Agreement contained no exculpatory language. 
It had a merger clause. Except for extras which were covered by the 
provision for "Changes in the Work, " the Construction Agreement could 
not be amended or altered unless it was done in writing and executed by 
the par t ies . 21 
The Construction Agreement was intended by the plaintiff to make 
the arrangement between the part ies, theretofore governed by the July 11 
let ter , more firm (R. 653), more complete and explicit. The Contractor 
required the Contract to bind the defendants before he was willing to com-
mence construction. 2 2 The parties were "bound to the full performance of 
the covenants and agreements" contained in the Contract (Article VII, Ex.P-l). 
2
 As the plaintiff acknowledged when he presented the defendants with a 
proposed amendment in connection with the partnership proposal. (See 
Ex. fs D-4 and D-5.) 
2 2 The Contract, according to Dr. Todd, was executed on October 12, 1972. 
The Court found that construction commenced on October 13, 1972. (Finding 
6, R. 1574) 
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A m o r e extensive analysis of the plaintiff 's a rgument that the 
Contract requi red future agreement i s included in the Tr i a l Brief filed 
by the defendants below (See: R. 1626 to 1641), 
The Tr i a l Court co r r ec t ly concluded that , n The Construct ion 
Agreement was nei ther p re l iminary nor tentat ive and did not consti tute 
an agreement to ag ree , n (Conclusion 3, R. 1577) 
J- The Construction Agreement was Subject to a P resumpt ion of 
Validity. 
The Construction Agreement , Ex. P - l , was eight pages long. 
It had sixteen pages of a t tachments , not counting the substantial body of 
plans and specifications which were incorporated by i ts t e r m s . It in-
cluded an i temized breakdown of cos ts and m a t e r i a l s (Ex. 12-D) and 
explicit and detailed General and Supplementary Conditions. 
The Agreement covered the C o n t r a c t o r s undertaking, the contract 
p r i c e , the method of payment , the r equ i r emen t s for te rminat ion , the 
resolut ion of conflicts, the question of bonding and a host of other de ta i l s . 
It contained machinery for the inclusion of cos ts or c red i t s resul t ing 
f rom changes in the work. It was executed with all requis i te formal i ty . 
The Contract , which the defendants al lege to be fully valid and 
enforceable, was p r epa red by the plaintiff 's own a t to rneys , who now 
cla im that it is not sufficiently definite and cer ta in . But for two changes, 
evident on Ex. 2-D, the Contract was , in every detai l , the product of 
the plaintiff, Mr . StangI, and of his counsel . 
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It is inconceivable that the defendants could have avoided their 
contractual obligations had the roles of these parties been reversed. 
The Contract did not permit alterations other than by written amendment, 
and anticipated the evolution of "detailed" working drawings, which had 
not been "finally" completed by the day the Contract was signed. It said: 
"The Contract represents the full and complete under-
standing between the owner and the Contractor and, except 
as expressly provided herein, the Contract may not here-
after be amended or altered except by proper amendment 
in writing executed by the part ies hereto. " (Article V, 
Emphasis supplied) 
A Contract which is fairly open to conflicting interpretations as 
to the validity or invalidity, is supported by a presumption of validity. 
Even if the Contract were ambigubus or uncertain, which the Construction 
Agreement here is not, the preferred construction would support the 
notion of its validity. Morgan v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. , 68 
Idaho 506, 201 P. 2d 976 (1948), Pur rant v. Snyder, 65 Idaho 678, 151 
P . 2d 776 (1944). 
When parties have entered into a contract, it is to be presumed 
that their intention was to make an effective rather than a nugatory 
agreement, and, therefore, unless such construction is wholly negatived 
by the language used, the agreement should be construed in such a way 
as to make the contract effective and the obligations imposed by its 
binding upon the part ies . Portland Gasoline Co. v. Superior Marketing 
Co. , 150 Tex. 533, 243 S.W. 2d 823. See also: 17 AmJur 2d "Contracts" 
254, p. 648, and cases there cited. The Trial Court has so construed 
the Construction Agreement. 
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Point III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN BASING DAMAGES ON 
THE COST TO COMPLETE THE APARTMENT COMPLEX. 
A. The Decided Law in Utah is That the Cost of Completion, 
Rather Than the Comparat ive Value, Is the P r o p e r M e a s u r e of Damages 
in Construction Contract Cases Such as This . 
The m e a s u r e of damages for b reach of a construct ion contract in 
the State of Utah has been dealt with by this court on at leas t two occas ions . 
These a r e Rex T. Fuhr iman , Inc. v. J a r r e l l , 21 Utah 2d 298, 445 P . 2d 
1
 t 
136 (1968), and Kel ler v. Dese re t Mor tuary C o . , 23 Utah 2d 1, 455 P . 2d 
197 (1961). Both cite with approval the cost of completion s tandard 
embodied in the Res ta tement of the Law of Cont rac t s , §346(1 )(a)(l) . That 
such is the law in Utah appears to be admitted by Appellant at page 45 of 
his Brief. 
In Fuhr iman , supra , the t r i a l court had awarded $1 ,200 .00 damages 
"based on a diminution in the m a r k e t value of the building. n The Utah 
Supreme Court held that , although the t r i a l court e r r e d in theory , it 
a r r i ved at the co r r ec t amount of damages . The c o r r e c t legal theory was 
stated in this language: 
"The Res ta tement of the Law Cont rac t s , §346(1) se t s 
forth the compensa tory damages recoverab le for b r e a c h of 
a construct ion contract as follows: 
(a) Fo r defective or unfinished construct ion he can 
get judgment for ei ther 
(i) the reasonable cost of construct ion and comple-
tion in accordance with the cont rac t , if this is poss ib le 
and does not involve unreasonable economic was te ; or 
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(ii) the difference between the value that the product 
contracted for would have had and the value of the pe r fo r -
mance that has been rece ived by the plaintiff, if cons t ruc -
tion and completion in accordance with the contract would 
involve unreasonable economic was t e . M 
and went on to hold as follows: 
' 'Although the t r i a l court e r r e d in i t s descr ip t ion of the 
award of damages , it based i t s evaluation on evidence of the 
cost of completion in accordance with the contrac t ; t he re fo re , 
the award of $1 , 200 is aff irmed. " Id. p . 139. 
In Kel le r , supra , the Utah Supreme Court dec la red the m e a s u r e 
of damages for b r e a c h of cont rac t , holding: 
"that the non-breaching par ty should rece ive an award which 
will put h im in as good posit ion a s he would have been in had 
the re been no b r each , " Id. p . 198 (Emphasis added) 
Applying this doc t r ine , th is Court a s s e s s e d (by diminishing his 
recovery) against a cont rac tor who had not completed his contrac t the 
reasonable cost of completion ($500 i t em in computation) though t h e r e 
was no indication that the work had ever been completed by the owner . 
Id. p . 198. Footnote 4 of Kel le r , supra , c i tes to the Res ta tement of the 
Law, Cont rac t s , §346, regard ing reasonable cost of complet ion. More 
specifically, this Court r e f e r r e d to §346 (l)(a)(i) which is i l lus t ra ted a s 
follows: 
M l . A con t rac t s to e rec t a building on B ! s land for 
$10,000, but repudia tes the cont rac t after B has paid 
$2, 000. The cost at which B can obtain the completion of 
the building by o thers i s $12, 000; and the ren ta l value of 
the house during the per iod of delay is $500. B can get 
judgment for $4 ,500, the cost of completion ($12,000), l e s s 
the p a r t of the p r i c e not yet paid ($8, 000), plus the los t 
renta l ($500). n 
».T* «.'.» •«'>• v l * 
*£* *(* T* T* 
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M4. A cont rac ts to cons t ruct a monumental fountain in 
B ' s yard for $5, 000, but abandons the work after the founda-
tion has been laid and $2, 800 has been paid by B . The con-
templated fountain is so ugly that it would dec r ea se the num-
ber of poss ible buyers of the p lace . The cost of completing 
the fountain would be $4, 000. B can get judgment for $1 , 800, 
the cost of completion l e s s the pa r t of p r i ce unpaid. f l 
1 Resta tement of the Law of Cont rac t s , 576-577 
In both i l lus t ra t ions , it is c lear that actual completion, i. e. , 
payment by the injured pa r ty of the full cost of completion, was not 
r equ i red before the reasonable cost of completion was awarded. 
Corbin, author of the R e s t a t e m e n t s §346, explains the pr inc ip le 
fur ther in Corbin on Cont rac t s , §1089, at page 488. He w r i t e s : 
"The amount actually paid by the owner to another cont rac tor 
for co r rec t ion and completion in accordance with the contract 
is evidential in determining the m e a s u r e of r ecove ry for the 
defendant 's b r each . M (Emphasis added) 
Payments for completion a r e m e r e l y evidence of the quantum 
of the cost of completion, not a condition precedent to r ecovery . As 
shown in the i l lus t ra t ions in the Res ta tement , subsequent bids on com-
pleting the work a r e a lso competent evidence of cost of completion. 
Requiring an intent to complete after Con t r ac to r ' s b reach , or 
penalizing one who de te rmines to pursue a different course after Con-
t r a c t o r ' s b reach , i s a lso against logic and good public policy. As Appel-
lant notes , t he re is no judicial supervis ion of how the owner u se s the 
damages he is awarded. He may choose to complete the building or to 
des t roy it and build an ent i re ly different one. In th is light, it makes 
l i t t le sense to penal ize an owner who, through unusual industry , embarks 
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on a new projec t before suing the breaching con t rac to r . To penal ize the 
owner who decides not to complete after the c o n t r a c t o r ' s b r e a c h also 
d i sc r imina tes against those owners who do not have enough wealth to 
complete the building immedia te ly and then sue the con t rac to r , or who 
lack the r e s o u r c e s to hold the projec t in abeyance while the con t rac to r 
i s sued, then complete the pro jec t . Such economic d i sc r imina t ion i s 
manifest ly unfair . 
B . The Burden of Proof i s on the Contractor to Es tab l i sh That 
the Cost of Completion Measu re Involves Unreasonable Economic Waste . 
The Utah ru le , which is the Res ta tement of Cont rac ts ru l e , provides 
for cost of completion if construct ion and completion , r is poss ib le and does 
not involve unreasonable economic was te . M C lear ly , completion of con-
s t ruct ion was poss ib le , had the Doctors chosen to do so . All it r equ i red 
was an additional sum of money to be commit ted to the project , and the 
Doctors elected not to so apply the i r funds. P r e sumab ly , if the Doctors 
had completed the complex for the additional $340, 879. 00 that the cour t 
found it would have cost , Appellant would concede that the cost of com-
plet ion m e a s u r e as used by the court was sound. 
It hardly appea r s to be an a t t r ac t ive s tandard of differentiation. 
Given exactly the same const ruct ion contrac t , those wealthy enough to 
actual ly build the s t ruc tu re involved in the defaulted contract shall have one 
r ecove ry , those so economically l imi ted, or so conserva t ive of inves tment , 
that they cannot or will not commit g r e a t e r sums to the building in hopes 
they can thereaf te r r ecove r it back f rom the bu i lder , shall have another 
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and l e s s e r award. They shall be b a r r e d f rom receiving the benefit of 
their bargain , and perhaps not even get the i r out-of-pocket cos ts r e -
turned . In a r is ing marke t , the compara t ive value s tandard would r e -
ward the owner, in a declining m a r k e t the value s tandard would penal ize 
him. Surely M r . Bumble ' s comment "If that i s the law, s i r " 
would find immedia te application. 
The joint questions of "what i s unreasonable economic waste and 
who has the burden of proving such "have been often considered. " Shell 
ya Schmidt, 164 Cal. App. 2d 350, 330 P . 2d 817, 76 A.L. .R. 2d 792 
(1958) and the excellent collection of ca se s compiled thereaf ter at 76 
A . L . R. 2d 805 entitled "Cost of cor rec t ion or completion, or difference 
in value, as m e a s u r e of damages for b r e a c h of construct ion ag reemen t" 
deal with th is subject. P a r t i c u l a r attention is invited to Section 5(b), 
"Where t he re is not substantial pe r fo rmance , " Section 6, "Wilful b r each 
by cont rac tor , " and Section 9, n F a i l u r e to complete s t ruc tu re ; abandonment" 
In Shell, supra , at page 823 the cour t c i tes P ro fe s so r Corbin as 
follows: 
"Corbin on Contrac ts , Vol. 5, page 408, Sections 1 089, 
et seq* s ta tes that the cost theory p reva i l s "if this is possible 
and does not involve unreasonable economic was te" (p. 409). 
The author goes on to say, at page 410: "Without question, the 
contract b r e a k e r should pay the cost of construct ion and comple-
tion in accordance with his contract un less he p roves affirmatively 
and convincingly that such construct ion and completion would in-
volve an unreasonable economic was te . " (Emphasis added) 
In Blecick v. School Dis t r ic t No, 18 of Cochise County, 2 Ar iz . 
App, 115, 406 P . 2d 750 (1965), cited with approval by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Rex T. Fuhr iman , supra , the ru le that the contract b r e a k e r 
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"must prove affirmatively and convincingly that such construct ion and 
completion v/ould involve an unreasonable economic waste11 i s adopted 
as the law of Arizona. 
In the instant case Appellant introduced no evidence at al l on 
the subject of economic was te . M r . Stangl appeared to bel ieve the projec t 
would be economically sa t is factory at the figure of $2, 700, 450. 00 plus 
10% overhead and profit if he could become the owner of a one- th i rd 
in t e re s t as a pa r tne r by investing his $270, 000. 00 overhead and profi t . 
Obviously, he did not think completion at the f igure the court found to 
be the fair cost of completion at the t ime of b r e a c h to be economically 
una t t rac t ive . His whole demeanor , and pa r t i cu la r ly Exhibits 5 and 6 
(Pa r tne r sh ip Agreement and Amendment to Construct ion Agreement) 
proposed by h im indicated that the projec t was economical ly des i rab le 
to him at the higher f igure . 
Since the Appellant had the burden of showing unreasonab le eco-
nomic was te in o rde r to t r i gge r the "difference in value" m e a s u r e , what 
is he requi red to show? Good d iscuss ions of va r ious au thor i t ies a r e 
found in Shell v. Schmidt, supra , Blecick, supra , and 76 A . L . R . 2d 805. 
F r o m these , Rex T. Fuhr iman , Inc. v. J a r r e l l , supra , and Prof. Corbin, 
ci ted above, the following l i s t e m e r g e s : 
1. Completion according to the cont rac t r e q u i r e m e n t s would in-
volve undoing a substant ial pa r t of what has been done. 
2. The s t r u c t u r e , a s it ex i s t s , i s such that it will r ende r sub-
stantial ly all the se rv ice that the s t ruc tu re contrac ted for would have 
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rendered or it i s shown p r i o r to b r each that completing the construct ion 
would not benefit owner. 
3. The con t r ac to r ' s b r each was in good faith and not wilfuL 
Appellant does not even c la im that the f i r s t two r equ i r emen t s 
a r e fulfilled and for this r eason alone should be precluded from the 
difference in value m e a s u r e . 
A good faith b r each by Contractor i s r equ i red by Shell v. Schmidt, 
supra , and other California c a s e s , but i s not r equ i red by Williston or 
Corbin. It s eems genera l ly agreed , however, that if the C o n t r a c t o r s 
b r each is tainted with bad faith, he cannot c la im the benefit of the 
difference in value m e a s u r e . This could be based upon "clean hands" 
cons idera t ions . 
Shell v. Schmidt, supra , d i scusses the meaning of "wilful" and 
concludes that it means "intentional" and that a wilful b r e a c h need not 
be in bad faith to prec lude t r igger ing the compara t ive value s tandard. 
The ru le is stated at page 827 as follows: 
"we found that the major i ty and be t t e r ru le is that t h e r e 
cannot be the "good faith" requi red by the substant ial p e r -
formance rule if t he r e have been intentional major deviations 
f rom the t e r m s of the cont rac t . " See 6 A . L . R . 137 
(Emphasis added) 
One cannot escape the conclusion that pulling off the job and r e -
fusing to r ecommence is anything l e s s than "an intentional major deviation" 
f rom the t e r m s of the cont rac t . See pages 51-52 of this Brief for a d i scus -
sion of the na ture and extent of A p p e l l a n t s b r each of his cont rac t . 
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C. Appellant 's Breach of the Construct ion Contract was Wilful 
and in Bad Fa i th . 
Respondents contend that Appel lant ' s b r e a c h was not only inten-
t ional but was also in bad faith. The cou r t ' s at tention is d i rec ted to the 
evidence showing that plaintiff intentionally held his men off the job 
in January , 1973, after learning of his mis t ake in pr ic ing Atlas b r i ck , 
told his construct ion foreman "That i s it for the Canyon Road projec t . " 
evidencing a determinat ion not to r ecommence told the a rch i tec t , M r . 
Molen, that he would not complete the projec t "unless he got a p iece 
of the action", summar i ly and tac i turnly refused to d i scuss p r i c e s with 
Dr . Lignell at the January 25, 1973, meet ing , proposed that he be cut 
in for one- th i rd of the projec t and p r e p a r e d documents to effectuate his 
p roposa l . What could m o r e readi ly es tabl i sh intent and wilfulness or 
m o r e c lear ly show bad faith? 
As is apparent f rom the difference between the cost r e - c a p s 
(Exhibits 12-D, 13-D and 14-D), M r . Stangl was caught in the pos tu re 
of having a f i rm pr ice contract in a per iod of rapidly r i s ing c o s t s , com-
23 pounded by negligence in bidding Atlas Br ick . He was faced with the 
a l te rna t ive of per forming the cont rac t at a ve ry substant ia l l o s s , or 
breaching the contract and taking his chances in cour t . The choice was 
easy . To the grea t de t r iment of the Doctors , he chose to take a chance 
on l i t igation r a the r than incur the loss ce r ta in to be incu r red if he p e r -
formed his cont rac t . 
2
"%hich the a rch i t ec t , and p re sumab ly , M r . Stangl, or iginal ly and 
e r roneous ly bel ieved was comparab le in cos t to concre te block 
(R. 321, 2, 1080) 
_7?_ 
D. Appe l l an t s Cases Distinguished. 
Plaintiff c i tes F o r r e s t e r v. Craddock (Wash. 1 957) and Peevy-
house v. Garland Coal & Mining C o . , (Okla. 1 963) for the proposi t ion 
that the compara t ive value rule should be adopted as the law of Utah and 
the law of this ca se , and ci tes Amer ican Surety (5th Ci r . 1901), and 
Nello v. Tee r (5th Ci r t 1963), for the proposi t ion that actually incur r ing 
the expense of completion is a condition precedent to r ecove ry of cost 
of completion. 
F o r r e s t e r i s a State of Washington case affirming a special ru le 
of that ju r i sd ic t ion pivoting on the question of whether or not t he re has 
been "substant ial completion11 by the con t rac tor . Of pa r t i cu la r in t e res t 
i s the port ion of the case between the quoted por t ions , which was left 
out by Appellant. Washington does not follow the Res ta tement ru l e . 
That Utah does i s long since decided. This case simply has no appl ica-
t ion in Utah. 
Peevyhouse is an Oklahoma case where the cost of completion was 
$29, 000. 00, the diminution of value caused by the b r e a c h was $300. 00 
and the ju ry awarded $5, 000. 00. The court reviewed the Res ta tement 
ru le [ §364(1 )(a)(i) and (ii)] and the McCormick on Damages , Section 168 
Rule and elected the l a t t e r . It a lso based i t s decision that the compara t ive 
value s tandard applied in Oklahoma on two special Oklahoma s ta tutes con-
trol l ing the award of damages . In the main , Peevyhouse has no application 
in Utah, however, that court , r e fe r r ing to the exact Res ta tement ru le 
adopted in Utah, had this comment (P. 2d at page 112): 
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nIn an explanatory comment immedia te ly following text , the 
Resta tement makes it c lea r that the !economic waste1 r e f e r r e d 
to cons is t s of the destruct ion of a substantial ly completed build-
ing or other s t r u c t u r e . Of cour se , no such des t ruc t ion i s in-
volved in the case now before u s . M (Emphasis added) 
Amer ican Surety Co. v. Woods, 105 F . 741 (5th Ci r . 1901), 
affirmed on rehear ing , 106 F . 263 (1901), cited by Appellants , is not 
applicable since it did not seek to es tabl ish s tandards under which the 
difference in value t e s t would be applied and was based upon four major 
findings, of which one was a contract provis ion, differing f rom the p r e s e n t 
cont rac t , which made actual completion a p r e - r e q u i s i t e to the cost of 
completion m e a s u r e . 
Amer ican Surety and Nello L. Tee r were d i scussed at length in 
the t r i a l b r ie f s on this point (see memoranda beginning at R. 1642 and 
R. 1 647) and considered by the Trial Court . T e e r (1 963) m a k e s the 
in teres t ing and i l l -advised comment that Amer ican Surety (1901) was 
"never over ru led or c r i t i c ized so far as we have a sce r t a ined . M The 
main effect of that comment was a reflect ion on the cou r t ' s scholarsh ip , 
since the s a m e court had, in Wills v. P e a c e Creek Drainage Dist . , 
4 F . 2d 519 (5th Ci r . 1925) held exactly opposite to Amer ican Surety, 
saying (at pg. 520): 
"That plaintiff1 s r ight to recover is not dependent upon com-
pletion of the work which the con t r ac to r s obligated themse lves 
to do i s well set t led. (Citing cases ) : (Emphasis added) 
The Amer ican Surety ru le has not been widely followed, as i s 
shown in Groves v. John Wunder Company, 205 Minn. 163, 286 N .W. 
235 (1939), City of St. Pau l v. Bie lenberg , 164 Minn. 72, 204, N .W. 
544 (1925), and Simons v. Wittman, 8 8 S . W . 791 (1905). 
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In Simons, supra , the t r i a l court stated 
"As to the contention that r ecove ry cannot be had until the 
employer has erec ted the buildings and asce r ta ined defi-
nitely the cost thereof, it i s laid down as a rule in 3 Suther-
land on Damages (3d Ed . ) § 699, that: "In such ca se s the 
employer i s general ly entitled to m e a s u r e his damages by 
what the n e c e s s a r y expense would be to p roc u re to be done 
the work which the contrac tor neglected to do, whether it 
was done or not; for the same reason that a vendee in an 
executory contrac t for the sale of goods need not in fact 
purchase the goods he was entitled to rece ive f rom the ven-
dor in o rder to have his damages computed on the b a s i s of 
what they would cost h im at the t ime of the b r each . " 
# >\< >\< >\< 
"The author i t ies a r e abundant sustaining the right of the 
employer to sue for his damages before erect ing the build-
ings , as i s shown by the following c a s e s : King v. Nichols, 
53 Minn. 453, 55 N .W. 604; Cincinnati , e t c . , Ry Co. v. 
Car thage, 36 Ohio St. 631; Taylor v. Ry. , 56 Cal. 317; 
Laraway v. P e r k i n s , 10 N, Y. 31 7; Hawley v . F lo r she in , 
44 111. App. 320; Amer ican Surety Co. v. Woods, 105 Fed . 
741-746, 45 C . C . A . 282; 3 Sutherland on Damages (3d Ed . ) 
§699 . ( 8 8 S . W . at page 795)" 
E . Neither the Fac t that Only a Small Por t ion was Constructed 
Nor the Commerc ia l Nature of the Pro jec t Requires Use of the Value 
Measure., 
Appellant contends that u se of the compara t ive value m e a s u r e of 
damages is r equ i red because (a) only a smal l p a r t of the project was 
const ructed and (b) the project was commerc i a l in na tu re and lacked 
special persona l value to the Doctors . Respondents contend that nei ther 
s tandard const i tutes "unreasonable economic was t e " as requi red by the 
Res ta tement nor o therwise compels re ject ion of the cost of completion 
m e a s u r e in favor of the compara t ive value m e a s u r e . 
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A case in point i s Henderson v. Pake s -Wate rman Bui lde r s , 
et a l . , 44 Cal . App. 615, 112 P . 2d 662 (Cal. 1941). The cont rac tor 
had abandoned the projec t after completing only a smal l p a r t . That 
which had been done was defective. The plaintiff-owner died in the 
cour se of l i t igation, his es ta te being submitted as plaintiff. This 
would seem to indicate t he re was no intent to complete on the p a r t of 
the owner. The opinion does not s ta te the owner1 s intended use of the 
p rope r ty , whether for pe r sona l occupancy, r e s a l e , or r en t a l . Any 
pe r sona l impor tance the s t ruc tu re had heldfor the owner, however , 
would have passed on with h im. It would have cost $288. 62 to demolish 
the defective construct ion and $3 ,107 .49 to build the contemplated 
building. The ren ta l value of the p rope r ty a t t r ibutable to delay in 
completion was $595.00. The t r i a l cour t had allowed only the con-
t r a c t p r i ce of $2 ,500 .00 as damages . 
The appellate cour t in te rp re ted the damages s tandard which s ta tes 
that the pa r t i e s should be placed ! ,in the same posi t ion full pe r fo rmance 
of the contrac t would have placed them in n a s follows: 
"We ask the fur ther question: 'If they had pe r fo rmed , 
what would the plaintiff have gained? ' The answer to that 
question i s : 'The kind of house that he barga ined for, 
namely, a house which now would cost , using al l salvaged 
m a t e r i a l and the cost of rec la iming it, $ 3 , 1 0 7 . 4 9 . I! 
(Emphasis added) 
The court eventually awarded the es ta te $3 , 702.49, based in p a r t 
upon finding that the c o n t r a c t o r ' s b r e a c h was wilful. 
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F . The Tr ia l Court1 s Measu re of Damages is Based on Appellant 's 
Own Evidence of Cost to Complete. 
The Trial Court here in based i t s findings of damages upon evidence 
of the cost to complete the buildings at the t ime of Appel lant ' s b r each . 
Those calculat ions w e r e : 
1. Cost to the Owners of construct ing the 
building with ex t ras $2 ,970,450 
2. L e s s : Cost to the Owners of the ex t ras (1 89. 475) 
3. Cost to the Owners of construct ing the 
building without ex t ras 2 ,780,975 
4. L e s s : Cost to the Owners of the work 
done by Contractor (40, 876) 
5. Cost to the Owners of Completing the 
Building without ex t ras and without the 
work a l ready done by Contractor 2, 740, 099 
6. L e s s : Unpaid contract p r i ce for the 
building without ex t ras 2, 399* 220 
7. Damages due Owners for Con t r ac to r ' s 
Breach of Contract $ 340, 879 
The f i r s t amount, cos t to the Owners of construct ing the building, 
was taken f rom Stangl 's own calculat ions made c lose to the t ime of b r e a c h 
(Ex. 13 -P , with 10% added for overhead and profi t) . The second amount 
the court calculated i t em by i t em (Ex. 116-D and R. 1507 to R. 1548). 
The fourth amount was based on M r . Stangl 's tes t imony respect ing his 
l ien c la im. The sixth amount i s the bas ic p r i c e found in the Construction 
Agreement , no p a r t of which had been paid. 
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G. There i s No Windfall or Penal ty in the Court1 s Award in 
th is Case . The Tr i a l Court1 s Award Was Conserva t ive . 
The Trial Court had to de te rmine whether to m e a s u r e the cost to 
complete by the Stangl bid of January 25, 1972, which was $2. 970, 450, 
including 10% for overhead and profit (Ex. 13-D), or by the Stangl bid 
of March 3, 1973 (Ex. 14-D) which was , including 10% for overhead 
and profit , $3, 41 3, 200. The f i r s t was p rox imate in t ime to the actual 
b r e a c h of contract and the la t te r was p rox imate to Appel lant ' s re jec t ion 
of the wr i t ten demand that he r ecommence const ruct ion. The cour t 
chose the l e s s e r of the two a l t e rna t ives , a decision favoring Appellant, 
not penalizing him. 
No m e a s u r e should award defendant 's an amount which is l e s s 
than the i r actual out-of-pocket expenditures which were r ende red wastage 
by plaintiff 's b r each . Defendants ' out-of-pocket cos t s resul t ing f rom 
plaintiff 's b r e a c h of contract were $276, 390, 32 (Ex. 70-D). The dif-
ference in the p r i ce of Atlas b r i ck between the contrac ted p r i c e and 
the Janua ry 25, 1973 pr ice , amounted to $324, 339. (supra, pp.1 2-1 3). 
The apar tment complex plaintiff had agreed to furnish to defendants 
would have cost $3, 41 3, 20a00 (less $1 89, 475. 00 ex t ra s and changes) 
according to Stangl 's March 3, 1973, bid, or $3 ,658 ,423 (less $189,875.00 
ex t r a s and changes) according to the Cannon Construct ion bid of March 9, 
1973 (Ex. 69-D). 
Since it would cost at l eas t a mil l ion dol la rs m o r e to build the 
same apar tment complex in March of 1973 than the cont rac ted p r i c e of 
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October , 1972, i t i s obvious that the Doctors had made a good barga in . 
It i s a lso obvious that an award of $340, 879, which is only $64, 489. 00 
m o r e than the defendants actual out-of-pocket cos t s , awards only a 
very smal l sum for the Doctors1 loss of the benefit of the barga in . 
To cha rac t e r i ze the Trial Cour t ' s award in th is case a s a 
"windfall" to the Doctors and a penalty to the Contractor i s a g ros s 
m i s - cha rac t e r i z a t i on . If anyone rece ived a windfall in th is c a s e , it is 
the plaintiff who was charged only $64,489 for causing the Doctors to 
lose the benefit of a barga in which by M a r c h of 1973 would have been 
worth in excess of a mil l ion do l l a r s . The t r i a l court did not award 
anything at all for the consequential damages i ncu r r ed by the Doctors , 
and did not award the cos t s of demolishing and removing plaintiff 's 
work which he had rendered u s e l e s s by his own b r e a c h . 
It is c lear that the Court has used a conservat ive s tandard in 
th is case , awarding the owners l i t t le m o r e than the i r actual out-of-
pocket cos t s . Cer ta in ly the award in th is cause should not be ove r -
turned a s "excess ive" or a "windfall" or a "penal ty". It was c lear ly 
none of these th ings . If anything, the award in th is cause i s inadequate 
and fails to put the Doctors in the posit ion they would have been in had 
Stangl per formed his contract instead of abandoning i t . 
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CONCLUSION 
An appeal f rom the Tr i a l Cour t ' s ruling was , because of the size 
of the judgment, an expected formal i ty . 
It i s a t r ibute to the even handed, met iculous way in which the 
Court conducted the complex and detailed three-week t r i a l , that the 
appeal is not burdened with al legat ions of unfa i rness or pre judice or with 
technical objections of a p rocedura l na tu re . The Court , in the face of 
some o rches t r a t ed confusion, refused to be diverted f rom the cons ide ra -
tion of the cen t ra l i s sues upon which the lawsuit tu rned . 
Judge Taylor was pr ivy to the plans and specif icat ions, and to the 
exper ts and pa r t i e s who were helpful i n the i r in te rpre ta t ion . The Court 
conducted the p r e - t r i a l , considered and ruled on the admiss ion of the 
abundant exhibits and conferred with counsel r egu la r ly in c h a m b e r s . 
After ref lect ive considerat ion and extensive wr i t ten brief ing, a lmos t a 
month after the p r e - t r i a l , the Court reso lved the factual i s s u e s against 
the Appellants . 
The Court found that the plaintiff without jus t cause or excuse 
ma te r i a l ly b reached his own Contract , ceased to pe r fo rm, removed 
his tools and equipment and refused to r ecommence construct ion in the 
face of p roper not ice. 
In a case where factual findings a r e as technical ly based as in the 
instant ca se , i t is difficult to ma tch the advantaged posi t ion of the lower 
cour t , where the cour t was a s s i s t ed by the physical p r e s e n c e of the 
expe r t s , and able to gauge, f i r s t hand, the credibi l i ty of the respec t ive 
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witnesses a s well . The T r i a l Court evaluated the p rob lems r a i s ed by 
the voluminous r eco rd on this appeal with painstaking c a r e and with 
g rea t pa t ience . 
As the de te rminer of the facts and because of his c lose proximi ty 
to the wi tnesses and the t r i a l , a s the exclusive judge of the credibi l i ty 
24 
of wi tnesses and of the "weight to be given evidence, ,f the t r i a l judge ' s 
findings should be upheld on this appeal . 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES and 
JOEL M. ALLRED 
E a r l D« Tanner 
Joe l M. Al l red 
At torneys for Respondents 
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DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P . 2d 290 (1962) c e r t i o r a r i denied-
S. Ct. 37, 371 U . S . 821, 9 L . Ed. 61 
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